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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

COMPARATIVE PENSION POLICY OUTCOMES
IN SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC NATIONS:
THE CASE OF FINLAND
Issues of pension viability are at the forefront of gerontological debate. The
uncertainty of long-term effects of the societal aging process on public pensions and the
constant public policy struggle to maintain income levels among pensioners are critical
points of discussion. As existing pension policies are examined and amended,
policymakers increasingly rely on experts of pension research and income inequality for
policy frameworks.
Gøsta Esping-Andersen’s (1990) Three Worlds of Welfare
Capitalism has provided the seminal typology for nearly two decades. His typology
consists of three regimes: liberal, conservative, and social-democratic.
The purpose of this research was to examine and compare the outcomes of
historical pension policy in a social-democratic nation (Finland) with pension-receiving
cohorts in a comparison nation of each regime: liberal (the United States), conservative
(Germany), and social-democratic (Sweden). Specific aims were: to investigate the
continuing viability of Esping-Andersen’s typology at a national (macro) level; to explore
a new analytical approach by disaggregating the population and conducting micro
analyses; and to examine the value of using more sensitive inequality indices (Atkinson
and Theil) in lieu of the commonly used Gini Index. Finland provides a case study focus
of the comparative analysis.
Analysis of Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) data confirms that EspingAndersen’s typology remains viable at the macro level for the liberal United States.
However, conservative Germany and social-democratic Sweden and Finland may be
shifting from their respective classifications with possible convergence of the
conservative and social-democratic regimes into a European regime.

A similar conservative-social democratic convergence is apparent for Finland at
the micro level. The trend for males across age cohorts suggests that the regimes are
converging. However, at all levels of micro analysis, the trend for females remains
consistent with a social-democratic regime. This may indicate that the Finnish pension
system allows females to remain independent of spousal employment in terms of
pension benefits.
Finally, the research suggests basic interpretability of the Atkinson Index
combined with the generation of 95% confidence intervals for the Theil index provides a
more robust method of analysis not offered with the Gini Index.
KEYWORDS: Gerontology, Pensions, Finland, Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism,
Income Inequality,
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Chapter One
Introduction
“For each of them, as the saying runs, is no city, but cities upon cities; two
at the least, each other’s enemies, the city of the poor and the city of the
rich; and in either of these is a vast number of cities which you will be
entirely wrong to treat as one.”
The Republic, Book IV (Plato, 320c B.C.), Trans. 1992
The Issue of Pension Viability
We are living in an epic era of aging. Consequently, aging issues are paramount
for most national governments (Chand & Jeager, 1996). At the forefront of
gerontological discussion are issues of pension viability, income stability and pension
equity among both present and future older adults (Diamond, Lindeman, & Young,
1996; Kolb, 1993; Moffit et al., 2002; Walker, 1999). Public pension schemes are under
intense scrutiny, with particular concern in many industrialized nations for limiting the
burden of retirement pensions on public coffers while simultaneously keeping
unemployment levels and the household tax burden low (Graetz, 1988). A recent joint
International Monetary Fund (IMF) - Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) working paper underscores this concern with the statement “The
combination of lower social security contributions and/or tax revenues, together with
higher social expenditures by governments has caused some [OECD] governments to
reassess the longer term viability of their systems” (Kalisch & Aman, 1997, p.15). Other
researchers concur that pension financial viability will remain one of the most critical
policy issues for national pension schemes during the next several decades
(Adamchak, 1993; Allen, Clark, & McDermed, 1995; Beattie, 1998; Brown, 1997; Du
Boff, 1997; Hutton, 1996). Pensions, as a fiscal expenditure, have even been described
as the largest single pressure point for public finance (Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development, 1997, p. 15). The overarching problem of pension
viability is examined in this dissertation from a gerontological perspective with a
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multidisciplinary approach using concepts from sociology, political economy, and
economics.
The long-term effects of population aging on public pensions are uncertain and
depend on a society’s economic and political adaptation of policy to potentially hedge
these effects (Pedersen, 1999). However, one certainty appears to be continued
pressure for an increase in public pension expenditure in the years ahead for the 30
member nations of the OECD (Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan,
Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal,
Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, and the United
States). The OECD is an international organization headquartered in Geneva,
Switzerland, comprised of countries sharing a mutual commitment to democratic
government and the market economy. The organization has a global reach with its
work covering economic and social issues such as macroeconomics, international
commerce, education, infrastructure development, science, and innovation.
Government planning for pension resource allocation is affected by shifts in the
age structure of a nation, both proportionately and in absolute numbers. Upward shifts
in age structure will result in an accelerated population demand for increased pension
benefits, and thus fiscal demand for increased pension contributions to meet those
demands exclusive of other reform measures (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Kolb, 1993;
Williamson & Pampel, 1993). As a result of increased life expectancy and decreased
fertility rates in the developed world, elderly support ratios (persons 65 and older per
100 persons aged 20 to 64) are on the rise (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1996). For
example, across developed nations, elderly support ratios have increased 10% to 40%
since 1990, and an additional 35% increase is projected in the developed world by the
year 2025 (Kinsella & Gist, 1995). This increase will result from large cohorts of
working-age people entering retirement. For example, the Baby Boom Generation in
the United States (76 million Americans born between 1946 and 1964) will increase the
ratio by 15.1% over the next 50 years (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1996).
Public pension expenditures in the major industrialized countries have sharply
increased since 1960 (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development,
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1997). As seen in Table 1.1, the Netherlands, Sweden, Italy and France show large
increases in public pension expenditure as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) for the 20 years from 1960 to 80. Changes ranging from a moderate increase to
a slight decrease in pension expenditure occurred during the 1980’s and the early
1990’s for all countries. For example, Finland increased public pension expenditures by
2.7% from 1960-80 and experienced a 4.0% increase between 1980 and 93.
Moderation in pension expenditure is a reflection of several macro-level factors
including increasing elderly support ratios, the increasing generosity of per capita
pensions due to the maturation of public pension schemes, and increased
unemployment rates during the 1980’s and 1990’s in some countries (Kosunen, 1997).
Increasing elderly support ratios as a factor for moderating pension expenditures may
seem counterintuitive; however, it should be noted that one policy response to an
increasing number of pensioners would be to reduce overall pension benefits. This
policy response can potentially reduce the amount of pension expenditure as was the
case in Finland during the late 1990’s (Timonen, 2001).
Table 1.1 Percentage Change in Public Pension Expenditures as a Percentage of
GDP, 1960-2050, Selected Countries
Actual
∆1960-80
∆1980-93 ∆1995-2010
Australia
1.6
-0.1
-0.3
Austria
3.9
1.4
1.4
Canada
4.6
1.6
0.1
Denmark
4.5
0.8
0.8
Finland
2.7
4.0
0.6
France
5.5
2.0
-0.9
Germany
2.4
-0.3
0.7
Ireland
2.0
-0.3
-1.0
Italy
6.5
3.6
-0.1
Japan
3.1
1.4
3.0
Netherlands
7.0
0.7
0.1
New Zealand
3.3
0.2
-0.7
Norway
4.8
1.5
0.8
Sweden
6.5
2.1
0.6
United Kingdom
2.3
0.8
0.7
United States
2.8
0.4
0.4
Adapted from Kalisch and Aman (1997, p. 48).
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Projected
∆2010-30
1.5
4.2
3.7
3.3
7.1
3.8
4.7
0.2
7.1
3.8
5.1
3.1
4.9
2.6
0.3
2.1

∆2030-50
0.7
0.5
-0.3
0.6
-0.1
0.9
1.0
0.2
0.0
3.1
0.2
1.5
0.6
-0.5
-1.4
0.4

Augmenting this increasing public finance burden is the constant public policy
struggle to maintain income levels among pensioners (Hemming, 1998). This debate
among policymakers occurs as a result of two political factors, one current and the other
historical, that must be addressed in policy-making decisions relative to pensions.
First, older adults worldwide currently are accruing power as a political group (American
Association of Retired Persons, 2000). Second, the historically implicit pension
promises made by national governments to older adults during their labor force
participation years must be addressed (Kalisch & Aman, 1997; Kalisch, Aman, &
Buchele, 1998).
Within the pension reform debates, OECD studies estimate an increasing
amount of unfunded pension liability under present pension funding arrangements
(Liebfritz, Roseveare, Fore, & Wurzel, 1995; Van den Noord & Herd, 1993). An
unfunded pension liability is created when current pension payments are not matched
by previous or current employment contributions. Unfunded pension liabilities can be
catastrophic to a nation’s economic system especially in situations when national
retirement systems have more current liabilities than can be leveraged against national
assets.
As existing pension policies are examined and amended, policymakers will
increasingly rely on experts in the field of pension research and income inequality for
policy strategy and advice. Researchers have developed several categorizing
frameworks, or typologies, to characterize the welfare state ethos of nations, and thus
the characterization of a nation’s pension structure. Indeed, the extensive use of these
typologies in policy development and strategy has become labeled as the “welfare
modeling business” and is likely to continue to gain momentum in the coming decades
(Abrahamson, 1999).
Definitions
Before proceeding to the theoretical context of the dissertation, several
definitions are helpful in understanding the issues in this research. These include the
definition of income inequality, the basic structure of pension schemes, and the overall
concept of pension benefits.
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Income Inequality
There are several definitions of income inequality found in the literature (Alderson
& Nielson, 1999; Jenkins, 1991; Mitchell, 1991; Smeeding, 1991). Typically, the
concept of income inequality is couched in terms of economic well-being and the
specific income distribution analyzed. What this means is that inequality is a
measurement of how much income is allocated to any one or group of individuals within
a given distribution. For the purpose of this research, income inequality is defined as
the “differences between individuals relative to their command of disposable income”
(Osberg, 1991, p. xii). Income inequality is used in the context of this research as both
an ordinal (ranking) and cardinal (relative comparison) measurement to examine the
effects of historic and current pension policy in four LIS nations.
Basic Pension System Structures
Pension systems in the developed world are generally categorized as: (1) payas-you-go (PAYG), (2) fully funded, and (3) partially funded (Niemela & Salminen,
1995b). A PAYG system operates as the name implies. The current working
population provides the financial resources for the pensions of the retired population. In
other words, benefits accruing to current pension recipients are financed by current
contributions of the labor force. In the case of a deficit, budget transfers from the
government can be temporarily implemented in some cases (Chand & Jeager, 1996).
An example of a PAYG system is the United States Social Security System which pays
current benefits with current contributions. A fully funded system is different from the
PAYG system because a contribution rate is chosen to accrue financial capital that
would equal current required payments to retirees plus payments needed for future
retirees, i.e. the current working population. An example of a fully funded system is the
employment pension system in Denmark [The Danish Labour Market Supplementary
Pension Scheme] (Kalisch & Aman, 1997). The final system is the partially funded
system. This system integrates features from both the fully funded and the PAYG
system. One important element of a partially funded system is that pension fund
reserves (money used to pay benefits) do not have to meet the full fiscal obligations of
beneficiary requirements, as the fully funded system must. An example of a partially
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funded system is the employment pension system in Sweden (Kalisch et al., 1998).
Table 1.2 provides a list of selected countries and their respective pension funding type.
Table 1.2 Funding Arrangements of Selected Public Pension Programs
Funding Arrangement
Canada
PAYG with “reserve” fund
Denmark
Fully-funded (defined contribution)
France
PAYG
Finland
Partially funded
Germany
PAYG
Japan
Partially funded
Sweden
Partially funded
United Kingdom
PAYG
United States
PAYG with “reserve” fund
Adapted from Kalisch and Aman (1997, p. 42) and OECD (1997, p. 26).
Two other terms should be defined, as they are common to all pension systems:
contribution rate and replacement rate. Contribution rate is defined as the percentage
of income taxed from the working population used as funding for the pension system.
Replacement rate is defined as the percentage of average annual lifetime income
replaced by the pension during retirement (U.S. Department of Labor, 1992).
Pension Benefits
All three types of pension funding arrangements consist of two main
components: a defined-benefit and/or a defined-contribution. Defined-benefit plans are
usually implemented in either PAYG or partially funded systems. A defined-contribution
plan is typically found in a fully funded system. In addition, defined-benefit plans can
have benefit levels either related to earnings, or independent of earnings, i.e., a flat rate
component (Chand & Jeager, 1996). Now that the basic terminology of pensions has
been described, we move to the theoretical framework of the dissertation.
Theoretical Framework
Gøsta Esping-Andersen’s (1990) Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism has
provided the seminal typology with which nations have been categorized in terms of
basic national political ideologies. Within the Three World’s typology, nations are
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classified as either Conservative, Liberal, or Social-Democratic regimes. In the words of
Walter Korpi and Joakim Palme, Esping-Andersen’s work is “the most influential attempt
to create a welfare state typology” (Korpi & Palme, 1998, p. 665). As with his
predecessors [T.H. Marshall, Asa Briggs, and Richard Titmuss] and the development of
the concept of the “welfare state”, Esping-Andersen’s typology was the genesis for the
“welfare modeling business” and has subsequently become the benchmark for
international comparisons (Abrahamson, 1999; Room, 2000). Esping-Andersen utilized
both macro- and micro-economic data combining them with political variables to
generate a total of seven indicators for clustering his dataset of countries into the three
worlds (Esping-Andersen, 1990).
Subsequent to the publication of Esping-Andersen’s Three Worlds of Welfare
Capitalism, a foray of critical reviews surfaced in the academic arena (Baldwin, 1992;
Blau, 1992; Clemens, 1993; Cnaan, 1992; Hicks, 1991; Holmwood, 1991; Kangas,
1991; Klein, 1991; O'Connell, 1991; Offe, 1991; Papadakis, 1991; Wacquant, 1992).
Overall, the reviews praise Esping-Andersen for contributing a stimulating new
conceptualization of the welfare state. However, they also describe empirical
weaknesses in the design. Major criticisms include: 1) Esping-Andersen’s static
treatment of the three developed typology regimes; 2) the use of cross-sectional welfare
expenditures for the analysis; and 3) the linear treatment of the political process and
subsequent policy development.
During the 1990s and into the 2000s, researchers both tested Esping-Andersen’s
typology using a cross-comparative method (Headey, Goodin, Muffels, & Dirven, 2000;
Headey, Goodin, Muffels, & Dirven, 1997; Wagner, 1995) and adapted the typology to
select nations in Southern Europe (Mingione, 2000) and the Czech Republic (Musil,
1995). In addition, researchers have made critical assessments of Esping-Andersen’s
typology regarding gender and ethnicity issues (Arts & Gelissen, 1999; Ginn, Street, &
Arber, 2001; Orloff, 1993; Quadagno, 1994; Quadagno & Fobes, 1995; Sainsbury,
1999).
Despite a historical body of critical literature of Esping-Andersen’s work,
researchers and policymakers still view this typology as the framework for welfare state
decision-making and resulting policy development albeit recognizing its limitations
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(Berge, Korpi, Palme, Stenberg, & Klas, 1999; Huf, 1998; Jensen, 1999; Korpi, 1999;
Korpi, 2000; Korpi & Palme, 1998; Room, 2000). As well as stating that typologies
“based on ideal types can never fit the real world” (p. 669), Korpi and Palme (1998)
have more recently suggested four worlds instead of three: encompassing, corporatist,
basic security, and targeted. Other researchers have even suggested five or six worlds,
thus, adding subtle dimensions to the welfare state discussion (Arts & Gelissen, 1999).
Recently, Esping-Andersen attempted to address specific criticisms of his 1990
book with his 1999 World Summit for Social Development paper and subsequent book
Comparative Welfare Regimes Re-examined (Esping-Andersen, 1999a; EspingAndersen, 1999b). These responses attempt to reclassify the typology as three “routes”
versus the previous three regimes. The social-democratic, liberal, and conservative
regimes are renamed the Scandinavian, Neo-liberal, and “labour” reductionist routes in
the most recent work. Esping-Andersen’s modified nomenclature may reflect a change
in his fixed regime structure to a more trajectory-based typology. In addition, EspingAndersen has offered his views on the sustainability of welfare states in the future
(Esping-Andersen, 2000b) as well as responded to an even more recent critical review
(Room, 2000) of his 1990 typology (Esping Andersen, 2000a). The fact that even the
most recent critiques of Esping-Andersen’s work focus on his original typology supports
the argument that his 1990 work is still predominant in welfare state research and
debate and will continue to be used as a policy framework (Jensen, 1999).
Research Questions & Specific Aims
As stated previously, pension viability will be a critical policy issue for many
western nations in the coming decades. Existing policies will be amended and new
policies initiated as policymakers and legislators attempt to address the issue. As
policymakers continue to examine reform solutions, the welfare state ethos used to
describe each nation will continue to shape baseline opinions of each nation’s pension
structure, as well as affect the future policy direction of that nation. Esping-Andersen’s
typology, as the seminal work, is likely to continue to be at the forefront of policymakers’
initial decision-making framework. It is essential that the typology be inherently valid in
contemporary times for continued use as a framework in policy development.
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Within this context, the overall purpose of this dissertation is to examine and
compare the effects of historical pension policy, as measured by income inequality, in a
social-democratic nation (Finland) with pension-receiving cohorts in a liberal (United
States), a conservative (Germany), and another social-democratic nation (Sweden)
using two inequality indices, the Atkinson Index and Theil Index, as comparative
measurements (Atkinson, 1970; Esping-Andersen, 1990; Theil, 1967). Using these
analytic tools, this research explores whether Esping-Andersen’s Three Worlds of
Capitalism typology remains valid for contemporary Finland at both the macro and micro
level. Given that previous research on the merits of Esping-Andersen’s typology has
suggested that the three regimes do not “fit” every nation, current economic and political
movements occurring in the developed world may necessitate a modification of the
typology. For example, it has already been suggested that the Netherlands does not
adequately ascribe to the conservative regime (Kloosterman, 1994). Arts and Gelissen
(1999) also criticized Esping-Andersen for misclassifying several Asian nations, such as
Japan, and amalgamating the “Antipodean” nations into the liberal regime. These serve
as just two examples of possible misclassifications within the typology.
One example of the economic and political movements that may be causing
regime shifts within Esping-Andersen’s typology is the process of retrenchment (Myles
& Quadagno, 1997; Pierson, 1994). Retrenchment is defined as the reduction or
elimination of fiscal programs and/or benefits within a national scheme. Public pensions
as an entire program will more than likely not be eliminated; instead, selected benefits
might be reduced or eliminated. Additionally, specific subpopulations may be targeted
for benefit modification with a supplement or reduction.
This research enriches the current pension research dialogue by critically
examining Esping-Andersen’s typology in terms of defining Finland as a truly egalitarian
nation and whether or not it exhibits characteristics, as measured by the level of income
inequality and resulting time-series trends, of more liberal (such as the United States),
conservative (such as Germany) or social-democratic (such as Sweden) nations as
defined by Esping-Andersen’s (1990) typology. As stated in the definitions section,
income inequality is defined as the differences between individuals relative to their
command of disposable income (Osberg, 1991). The research contends that Finland is
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misclassified in Esping-Andersen’s typology and is actually producing policy outcomes
inconsistent with social-democratic nations (e.g., Sweden) relative to pensioners’
income inequality. The potential misclassification is supported by the fact that studies
omit Finland from the analysis of Scandinavian countries (Aaberge et al., 1998).
Growing out of this question are three specific aims. The first is to investigate the
continuing viability of Esping-Andersen’s welfare state typology at a national (macro)
level. A second research aim is to explore a new analytical approach by disaggregating
the population and conducting micro-level analysis. A third research aim is to examine
the value of utilizing more sensitive inequality indices (Atkinson and Theil [pronounced
Tile]) over the more commonly used Gini index. In order to conduct this research, a
case study of Finland is used in a comparative analysis. Finland is compared with
exemplars of Esping-Andersen’s welfare state typology: the United States (Liberal),
Germany (Conservative), and Sweden (Social-Democratic).
This research addresses a two-fold gap in the current literature. First, two
separate inequality coefficients are used to examine pensioners’ incomes. Previous
research has typically used the Gini coefficient (Atkinson, 1996; Branco, 1985; Frick,
Hauser, Muller, & Wagner, 1995; Fritzell, 2001; Gustafsson & Johansson, 1999;
Hauser, Wagner, Frick, & Muller, 1994; Kawachi & Kennedy, 1997; Kennedy, Kawachi,
Glass, & Prothrow Stith, 1998; Korpi & Palme, 1998; Lehtonen, 2000; Park, 1996). This
research utilizes both the Atkinson and Theil indices and augments previous research
by providing a more comprehensive picture of income inequality enhanced by the
generation of confidence intervals supporting the validity of the indices and their
interpretability. The use of this dual-index approach directly responds to Mitchell’s
(1991) call for the use of multiple indices in analysis of income inequality. Second, this
research will suggest modifications to Esping-Andersen’s typology that may more
accurately reflect contemporary issues occurring in OECD nations and have important
implications for future policy development related to maintaining pension viability.
Finland: A Case Study for Esping-Andersen’s Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism
Finland provides an excellent example to test the viability of Esping-Andersen’s
typology. Finland exhibits the prevailing theme underlying major changes in pension
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programs among industrialized nations: pervasive governmental concern about the
ability of national pension schemes to manage future financial burdens. Finland is
considered one of the most “aged” countries in the world, a situation exacerbated by its
low fertility rates relative to the longevity of its elderly population. Finland’s nine million
citizens occupy 338,000 sq. kilometers with a majority of the population residing in the
urban areas of Helsinki and Turku. The country is politically described as a
parliamentary republic and has been an independent nation with its own constitution
since the early twentieth century (Jakobson, 1996). This constitution grants the majority
rule of legislative power to local municipalities, a power structure that can create
regional conflict with regard to policies regarding nationally legislated pension schemes.
Changes in Finland’s compulsory supplementary pension schemes have
occurred for two reasons. First, Finland has raised individuals’ pension contributions as
a result of a reduction of premium income. Rapid increase in unemployment over the
past decade resulted in contribution rates inadequate for sustaining the current pension
system (Tanskanen, 1997). A second reason for changes in Finland’s pension
schemes has been concern for the long-term stability of pensions in view of the
progressive aging of the population.
Current demographic changes in Finland provide supporting evidence of the
imminent problems facing Finnish older adults. Individuals age 60 and older made up
19% of Finland’s population in 1996. This percentage is projected to increase to
approximately 31.4% by the year 2025 (Statistics Finland, 1999). Individuals 75 years
of age and older made up 5.8% of the population in 1996, a percentage that is projected
to increase to 11.6% by 2025 (Statistics Finland, 1999). These upward shifts will result
in a median age increase of seven years (38 to 45) by the year 2025 (U.S. Department
of Labor, 1992). The number of pensioners as well as the percentage of total social
expenses devoted to old age pensions has increasd in Finland since 1992. Currently,
approximately 837,000 Finnish pensioners consume slightly over 29% of total social
expenditures in the form of old-age pensions. On an aggregate level, Finnish pension
payments amount to about 14% of Finland’s gross domestic product (GDP), a
proportion projected to increase to approximately 17% by the year 2030 (Statistics
Finland, 1999).
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Finland’s membership in the European Union (EU) and European Monetary
Union (EMU) also supports the use of Finland as a case study. Finland is more actively
pursuing full European Union integration compared with its Scandinavian neighbors
(Sihto, 1999; Vogel, 1999). Finland’s membership in the EMU will further integrate its
future fiscal policy with continental Europe and link future pension valuation directly to
the Euro (€), unlike Sweden and Norway, which are not in the EMU. Denmark is
currently in the EMU; however, a referendum may be called by voters to revisit
membership. This monetary policy link has been called a “convergence criterion”
(Pierson, 1997). Membership in the EMU requires the Finnish Ministry of Finance to
convert the banking system to Euros as the transaction currency under a specific
timetable. This timetable affects the Finnish pension system in several ways. Section
4.5.3 of the European Monetary Union Project plan requires the Social Insurance
Institution to continue paying beneficiaries in Finnish Markkas throughout the
transitional period. Social security benefits paid to a customer's Euro bank account will
be converted into Euros by the bank. All Social security benefits have been paid in
Euros since January 1, 2002 (KELA - The Social Insurance Institute of Finland, 2000).
Finland exhibits modest concern for its pension viability as well as concern for
the high unemployment level for older people. However, unemployment among the
elderly population is precipitated by the fact that pensioners cannot participate at any
rate in the workforce and receive a pension. This practice is known as an agent-state
relationship (Kenc & Perraudin, 1997). The most recent pension reforms in Finland
occurred during the period from 1993 to 1996 (reduced benefit rates) with separate
reform legislated in 1997 to gradually increase pension contribution rates until the
2030’s (Timonen, 2001). Private pension schemes will be steadily implemented over
the next decades. There is no anticipated increase in Finland’s pensionable age
requirement of 65. Finland’s pension replacement rates have increased since 1961 with
the current rate at 60% of an individual’s lifetime income with current pensioners
receiving 24.5% of the average annual wage in Finland.
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Comparative Description of Pension Characteristics
In addition to analysis of the current pension reform situation for Finland, this
dissertation includes a comparison with exemplars of each regime of Esping-Andersen’s
(1990) typology: the United States (Liberal); Germany (Conservative); and Sweden
(Social-Democratic). We turn next to a preliminary comparative description of the
pension characteristics and reform status of the remaining three countries in
comparison to Finland (See Table 1.3).
Table 1.3 Pension Characteristics and Reform Status of Four OECD Nations

Concern
about
Financial
Viability
Other
concerns

Recent
reforms
Pensionable
age increase

Finland
Modest

Sweden
Serious

High
unemployment
rates of older
people

Fiscal
consolidation
has had a
harsh effect on
older adults
1990
1993
1995
No

1993-96
1997
No

Changes in
benefit rate

Reduced
benefit rate
1993-6

Increased
contribution
rate

Gradual rise
until 2030s

Reduced
benefit rate
and indexing
arrangements
In 1993
Increased
linkage of
benefit rates to
contributory
years
In 1999
Payroll tax for
employers in
1990. 1%
contribution for
employee’s in
1995
13

Germany
Serious

United States
Serious

Encouragement
Promotion of
of private
company
pensions
pensions.
Intergenerational
equity
1992 (-2020)
1996
1997 (-2012)
Equalizing
women with the
age for men (65)
Net-income
indexing in
1992.
Reduced
targeted
replacement rate
(70%-64%)
1997

Both men and
women raised
to 67
N/A

N/A

N/A

Table 1.3 Pension Characteristics and Reform Status of Four OECD Nations (cont.)
Tax
Gradual
N/A
Corporate
Promoting
concessions
implementation
schemes are
private
promoted with
schemes
legislation dating
back to 1974
Wanting to
further expand
private schemes
Pensionable
65
65
65(M) 56(W)
65
age (1997)
Replacement
rate:
1961
34.9
53.8
60.2
39.1
1975
58.6
77.1
59.6
49.1
1995
60.0
74.4
55.0
56.0
4%
0%
11%
0%
Increase in
pension for 55
yr old in 1995
who works 10
more years
24.5%
15.4%
53%
21.9%
Benefit as a
% of Annual
Wage (1995)
21.5
26.9
23.8
19.0
Elderly
Dependency
Ratio (1995)
17.9%
19.8%
18.6%
12.4%
Pension
contribution
rates (1995)
8.5%
8.4%
10.9%
6.0%
Gross
Pension
Expenditure
(as a
percentage of
GDP)(1997)
18.1 (male) –
19.8 (male) –
18.1 (male) –
18.9 (male) –
Life
22.9 (female)
23.9 (female)
22.5 (female)
22.9 (female)
Expectancy at
60
Adapted from the following sources: (Blöndal & Scarpetta, 1998; Kalisch & Aman,
1997; Kalisch et al., 1998; Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development,
1997; Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2000)
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Finland versus the United States
The United States considers the financial viability of its pension system to be a
major concern while Finnish policymakers only report modest concern for its pension
scheme (Kalisch & Aman, 1997). Finland is concerned with high unemployment for its
aging population while the United States doesn’t officially report that as a policy
concern. Finland’s concern stems from its agent-state relationship that requires a
pensioner to leave the workforce entirely prior to receiving a pension (Kenc & Perraudin,
1997)(p.259). Both nations are promoting private pension schemes albeit using
different strategies. The United States promotes private pensions using tax
concessions while Finland proposes a gradual implementation based on the outcome of
the implementation of Sweden’s private pension system (Carroll, 2001).

Both the

United States and Finland have experienced recent reforms. As shown in Table 3, the
United States’s pensionable age will gradually increase from 65 to 67 over the period
from 2000-2027. Finland gradually reduced its pension benefit rate in the period from
1993-1996 and will gradually increase the individuals’ contribution rate with a phased
approach until the 2030’s.
Both nations have similar income replacement rates for pensioners. As of 1995,
Finland’s target replacement rate was 60% of average annual lifetime income. The
effective replacement is between 40-50%. The United States target replacement rate
has also increased over the past four decades to 56% of average lifetime earnings.
Pension benefit as a percentage of average national annual wage is also an indicator
that is similar for both countries (Finland – 24.5% and United States – 21.9%). Finland
and the United States also have similar elderly dependency ratios (Finland – 18.1 and
United States – 18.9) and similar female life expectancies at age 60 (Finland – 22.9
years and United States – 22.9 years). However, the countries differ slightly regarding
gross pension expenditure as a percentage of GDP (Finland – 8.5% and United States
– 6.0%). These macro-level indicators reveal that the United States, while
geographically different, has several similarities to Finland and therefore offers a robust
comparison nation for Finland classified under the liberal regime within EspingAndersen’s (1990) typology.
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Finland versus Germany
Germany considers the financial viability of its pension system to be a serious
concern while, as noted, Finland only reports modest concern for its pension scheme
(Kalisch & Aman, 1997). Additionally, these two nations are different in their
consideration of other pension concerns. Germany is concerned with promoting unionbased employment pensions and intergenerational equity while Finland is concerned
with high unemployment for its aging population. Both Germany and Finland have also
experienced recent reforms. Germany has recently equalized the pensionable age with
regard to gender. German females now must be 65 to receive retirement benefits,
whereas they could previously retire at 56. Germany, unlike Finland, also has modified
the indexing of pensions in 1992 and reduced the targeted replacement in 1997.
Both nations are promoting private pension schemes albeit using different
strategies. Germany promotes private corporate pension schemes while Finland
proposes a gradual implementation based on the outcome of the implementation of
Sweden’s private pension system (Carroll, 2001). Both nations have similar income
replacement rates for pensioners. As of 1995, Finland’s target replacement rate was
60% of average annual lifetime income. The effective replacement is between 40-50%.
Germany’s target replacement rate is now 64% with the effective rate equal to 58%.
Pension benefit as a percentage of average national annual wage is an indicator that
differs between the two countries (Finland – 24.5% and Germany – 53%). Finland and
Germany have different elderly dependency ratios (Finland – 19.7 and Germany –
23.8); but female life expectancies at age 60 (Finland – 22.9 years and Germany – 22.5
years); and pension contribution rates (Finland – 17.9% and Germany – 18.6) are
similar. The nations differ regarding gross pension expenditure as a percentage of GDP
(Finland – 8.5% and Germany – 10.9%). These macro-level indicators reveal that
Germany, while geographically different, has several similarities to Finland and
therefore offers a robust comparison nation for Finland that is classified under the
conservative regime within Esping-Andersen’s (1990) typology.
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Finland and Sweden
Sweden considers the financial viability of its pension system to be a serious
concern while Finland only reports modest concern (Kalisch & Aman, 1997).
Additionally, these two nations are different in their consideration of other pension
concerns. Sweden is concerned about the impact of previous cutbacks on pensioners
while Finland is concerned with high unemployment for its aging population. Both
Sweden and Finland have had recent reforms with Swedish reforms actually beginning
slightly earlier in 1990. Sweden has not increased the pensionable age from the current
age of 65. Sweden, like Finland, reduced both pension benefits rate and modified the
indexing of pensions in 1993. In 1999, Sweden associated benefit rates with
contribution years during employment. Also, Sweden implemented a payroll tax for
employers in 1990 and added a one percent employee contribution in 1995.
Both nations are promoting private pension schemes. Sweden recently (2000)
implemented its private pension scheme giving employees a choice of seven schemes
while Finland proposes a gradual implementation based on the outcome of the
implementation of Sweden’s private pension system (Carroll, 2001). Both nations have
relatively high income replacement rates for pensioners. As of 1995, Finland’s target
replacement rate was 60% of average annual lifetime income. The effective
replacement is between 40-50%. Sweden’s target replacement rate is 74.4% of
average lifetime income. Pension benefit as a percentage of average national annual
wage for Finland is 24.5% and for Sweden is 15.4%. Finland and Sweden have
different elderly dependency ratios (Finland – 19.7 and Sweden – 26.9); different female
life expectancies at age 60 (Finland – 21.9 years and Sweden – 23.9 years); and record
similar gross pension expenditures as a percentage of GDP (Finland – 8.5% and
Sweden – 8.4%). These macro-level indicators reveal that the Sweden, while
geographically similar, has several differences to Finland and therefore offers a robust
comparison group for Finland that is classified under the social-democratic regime
within Esping-Andersen’s (1990) typology.
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Policy Relevance
Given current pension reform debates, knowledge of micro-level income
inequality outcomes can provide policymakers with information about the potential
effectiveness of the legislative policy process regarding specific pension issues and
pensioner subpopulations. This research will also fill a current gap in the pension policy
literature. Although it is documented that income inequality exists in both the United
States and Europe with disparities on the rise in many nations, the literature has not
addressed the potential effect a regime shift would have on public pension policy at the
macro (national) or micro (subpopulation) level (Auerbach & Belous, 1998). For
example, if a social democratic nation such as Finland is actually producing micro-level
inequality outcomes characteristic of a liberal nation such as the United States, this may
indicate a future change in pension policy direction of social democratic nations (Yellen,
1998). It is critical that income inequality outcome comparisons be conducted to assess
the validity of Esping-Andersen’s (1990) typology in categorizing nations for
comparative analysis.
Because most public flat-rate pensions in both the OECD and European Union
are currently paid on a PAYG basis, current policies may need to be changed to avert
an inevitable increase in national spending to subsidize the projected increased number
of pensioners. This increase in spending is compounded by Europe’s dependence on
public flat-rate pensions for the significant portion of pension expenditures (88%)
(Eurostat, 1997). It should be acknowledged that the need to maintain expected
retirement income levels for future beneficiaries is resulting in the expansion of
supplementary retirement income such as earnings-related pensions and private sector
pension schemes.
The implementation of pension reform varies among the OECD member nations.
For example, Belgium, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the United States
have not implemented significant changes in the past decade, while Denmark, Finland,
France, and Germany initiated reforms during the 1990s. One possible strategic reform
for many nations is transitioning the public flat-rate pension schemes from a PAYG to a
funded system. However, implementing the transition in developed and mature public
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pension systems, such as those prevailing in the European Union, can result in political
suicide for legislators. The main difficulties are the lack of consensus on the solution for
managing the future liabilities already ‘committed’ to the current workforce under the
existing system and the simultaneous creation of a self-funded private system. Other
methods of reform include “later retirement”, “cost-containment”, and “targeting”.
Pension reform using later retirement as the key structural change would generally
offset many impending demographic pressures. Cost containment reform’s main policy
strength is in its ability to maintain fiscal equity by utilizing across-the-board budget cuts.
However, this reform could shift large numbers of pensioners into poverty. Population
targeting as a method of pension reform is practical in form because it singles out
specific pensioners (by income level for example) to receive benefits and forces
pensioners with higher incomes to rely on the market economy. Korpi and Palme’s
(1998) research suggests that targeting specific populations, as a reform strategy, may
not have the capability to reduce fiscal inequity in any population, including, but not
limited to pensioners.
Having laid out the framework for the dissertation, we turn in Chapter 2 to the
theory and context of welfare state typology development.
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Chapter Two
Theory and Context
A substantial increase in the use of welfare state typologies in comparative
studies has occurred to the point that many take for granted that the world consists of a
limited number of well-defined welfare regimes. This chapter shows that the idea of
classifying welfare states according to ideal-typical models dates back to the late 1950s
and has been elaborated substantially over the past 50 years. The publication of Gøsta
Esping-Andersen's (1990) The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism is identified as the
seminal point for what has become a developing academic industry, here referred to as
the "welfare modeling business.” This chapter will chronicle the development of welfare
state literature that led to the formulation of Esping-Andersen’s Three World’s of
Welfare Capitalism. This chronology is designed to provide both a temporal and
theoretical context for Esping-Andersen’s typology. Different typologies with varying
degrees of differentiation are discussed in two broad categories: 1) social class issues
and the development of the concept of welfare state; and 2) welfare state types and the
emergence of the Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism. This chapter concludes with a
summary of the critical reviews of Esping-Andersen’s typology.
Social Class and Development of Definitions of the Welfare State
Considered one of the founders of modern welfare state literature, T. H. Marshall
(1950) discussed the concept of citizenship rights in his posthumously published
essays. Marshall argued that full citizenship within any nation proceeds in three stages
of the development of civil, political, and social rights. Civil rights are those “necessary
for individual freedom—liberty of the person, freedom of speech, thought and faith, the
right to own property and to conclude valid contracts, and the right to justice” (p.10). An
example of a civil right is the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Political rights are those needed to “participate in the exercise of political power, as a
member of a body invested with political authority or as an elector of the members of
such a body” (p.11). An example of a political right is the right to vote. Social rights
range from the “right to a modicum of economic welfare and security to the right to
share the full social heritage and to live the life of a civilized being according to the
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standards prevailing in the society” (p.11). An example of a social right is a national
pension or national healthcare linked to citizenship. The concept of social rights would
become the basis for the modern welfare state.
Although this is never explicitly stated, Marshall presents his three stages of
personal rights development as a linear model for all nations. It should be noted that
the linearity of his model has not been supported in the literature. In other words, social
rights could be bestowed on a population prior to political rights. Marshall’s contention
was, however, that social rights were required to develop civil and political rights. I must
disagree with his position and propose that civil and political rights probably precede the
development of social rights because issues surrounding property ownership would
have taken priority in agrarian societies prior to industrialization.
Regardless of these limitations, Marshall’s postulates still have applications more
than fifty years later. An example of their application is the response to his question
concerning whether or not society has enough economic resources to eliminate the
working class and create a single class of gentlemen. It could be argued that modern
society is trying to accomplish Marshall’s challenge for select groups of individuals. For
example, in Finland, a significant majority of workers are being trained in the area of
high-tech industrial development, while at the same time workers who are in
nonessential industries, i.e., agrarian, are being displaced. Considered an idealist,
Marshall would have been a strong proponent of the “cottage industry”, a world full of
craftsman and philosophers, which are all but extinct in modern society. The reality of
the new global market discounts Marshall’s genteel society even though he was not
advocating a welfare-free capitalist economy (Esping-Andersen, 1990).
Marshall’s contextual bias should also be addressed at this point. Marshall wrote
during a time in England when Caucasian men had significantly more rights than any
other group of individuals including women and minorities. His theory exhibits distinct
bias toward upper class English society and against women regardless of social
position. His emphasis on education as the main economic stimulus to produce his
desired outcome, a society of gentlemen, reflects cultural attitudes that would have
excluded women from most, if not all, economic opportunities. Evidence of his bias is
found in such statements as “the uneducated cannot appreciate, and therefore, freely
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choose, the good things which distinguish the life of a gentleman from that of the
working classes” (p. 6). This concept is defined as “choice capacity creation” and is
predicated on the assumption that education will stimulate not only the choice, but also
the type of choice Marshall desires. Marshall’s association of basic human equality with
the concept of full membership in a community clearly defines the membership
boundaries for different citizens within a given society. His assumption that the modern
market-oriented society, by its very nature, has a predisposition toward creating social
equality was the latest phase [at that time] in the evolution of the discussion on
citizenship rights (Marshall, 1950).
Writing a decade after the publication of Marshall’s essays, Asa Briggs (1961)
provides a clearer definition of the term “welfare state” in his historical essay. Briggs’s
definition of welfare state is predicated on the concept of “freedom from want" which he
directly links to the power of educational attainment, as did his predecessor Marshall.
Briggs’s theoretical predication of “freedom from want” reflects Marshall’s concept of
social rights previously discussed. Theoretically, the mechanism of social rights would
create “freedom from want” by developing social programs and services for citizens.
The idea of “freedom from want” began to reshape the “English Poor Law” type of public
support laws common during the eighteenth century. Evidence of this new idea was
more pronounced in Britain where the post-World War II definition of “welfare state”
included policies that had direct and immediate social consequences such as minimum
income definitions, income supports, the attainment of full employment, and the
financial support of elders, which, over time, became the modern-day British social
welfare system.
Briggs’s (1961) definition of welfare state incorporated three nonlinear goals that
should be achieved. First, a welfare state should guarantee a minimum income to all
citizens regardless of financial connection to the labor market or real property. The
national pension in Finland or supplemental support income (SSI) in the United States
are examples of how the welfare state can achieve this goal. Marshall’s (1950) view of
social rights would be met in the context of achieving this goal because “a modicum of
economic welfare and security” would be attained by all citizens. Second, the welfare
state should provide programs that protect citizens against “social contingencies” such
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as illness or unemployment. An unemployment pension would be an example of
achieving this goal. Again, programs designed to support the unemployed would
expand the social rights of citizens by guaranteeing economic security in the face of
social uncertainty. Third, the welfare state should develop programs and services using
the best available standards. This welfare state goal is actually an expansion of
Marshall’s idea of social rights. Marshall (1950) described social rights in the context of
“prevailing community standards” (p. 11). The term “prevailing” suggests the potential
for wide variation in program and service development because local municipalities
could possibly determine their own prevailing standards. Briggs’s use of “best
standards” argues for a national standard for all services developed for the population.
In addition, Marshall’s concepts of civil and political rights are inherent to the attainment
of Brigg’s three goals because without political participation empowering citizens to
enhance their civil rights, social goals meet societal obstacles.
In concert with Marshall (1950), Briggs presents the idea that as welfare states
develop in more economically advantaged societies (e.g., OECD nations), perceptual
changes occur regarding the definition of citizenship. Briggs states there are five
historical considerations underlying the development of welfare states: 1) market forces;
2) social contingencies; 3) organized power; 4) range of agreed social services; and 5)
demand for minimum standards. Market forces can be described as the basic
economic mechanism of supply and demand. Social contingencies are programs
developed to combat downturns in the economic business cycle, such as
unemployment benefits and national healthcare. Examples of organized power are
labor unions or political parties. The range of agreed social services are the specific
array of social service benefits provided to, and expected by, citizens at any given point
in time. Demand for minimum standards is best explained by society’s expectation of
the level of subsistence provided to all citizens by the government. Briggs’s assertion is
that all five, indeed, even the first three, never simultaneously exist in the development
of the welfare state nor do they follow a linear path.
Briggs’s argument, simply stated, is that as welfare states expand, the nation’s
view of egalitarianism expands and political issues such as the availability of housing,
healthcare, education, and social security become increasingly based on citizenship.
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This view presents a circular argument of welfare state development. Does the
egalitarian attitude precede the development of the welfare state or vice versa? This
argument is not easily resolved (Briggs, 1961).
Finally, Briggs addressed the "myth of the welfare state", created in the late
1950s, in his conceptualization of the welfare state. This myth stated that
“contemporary social problems have been solved since 1945” as a result of the postwar
boon that generated employment and expanded the social programs of the New Deal
(Amenta & Poulsen, 1996). Moreover, the knowledge that large sums of money, raised
through a level of unprecedented taxation, were being used to wage war without
difficulty led to the conclusion that smaller sums of money could produce a "welfare
state" in times of peace. Even in the early 1960s, the concept of "paying for services"
had replaced "fair shares for all". This was prior to Johnson’s Great Society programs
and well before the 1980’s era of perceived and real retrenchment (Pierson, 1994).
Recently, this policy attitude of “paying for services” has even found its way into more
egalitarian societies such as Sweden (Olsen, 1999).
Welfare State Types and Development of the Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism
In the mid-1970s, Richard Titmuss (1975) presented a more expansive work
about welfare state types. This research was welcomed because of the disparate use
of the terms “social services" and "social welfare" across Europe and North America.
Cultural, as well as historical differences, contributed to variations in and overlapping
use of these welfare state terms. Also, there was a need to move beyond education as
the catalyst for developing a welfare state. Titmuss presents a two-pronged model of
welfare state development (Titmuss, 1975). The first prong is the Residual Welfare
Model, which claims that the state’s objective is to control social behavior and to
maintain law and order through social policy. Social policy is defined as “choices
between conflicting political objectives and goals and how they are formulated” (p. 49).
The second prong is the Redistributive Social Policy Model, which views social policy as
a tool for use in the provision of social welfare, as defined by any given nation. This
two-pronged model expands Briggs’s five historical considerations into two separate
models. Market forces and organized power are more influential within the Residual
Model. Social contingencies, range of agreed social services, and demand for minimum
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standards are more influential in the Redistributive Model of the welfare state.
Titmuss’s model is the first attempt to bifurcate nations based on social policy
responses to population needs. Linking back to Marshall (1950), these policy
responses could come in the form of civil, political, or social rights expansion with the
response classified as Residual or Redistributive. Titmuss’s model can be linked to
Briggs’s (1961) work in terms of social policy response to attaining the three goals of the
welfare state. How an individual nation addresses the issues of minimum income and
social contingencies can be categorized within the two prongs.
One of the more interesting concepts in Titmuss’s work is his definition of a policy
success. He frames the discussion in the context of a metaphor: “the success of a
mental hospital”. The role of such institutions is either to properly medicate mentally ill
patients and return them to society or to maintain them in the hospital setting. Titmuss’s
discussion has strong implications for any policy evaluation because how policymakers
define success can create expectations, which, in turn, lead to the formulation of new
policies possibly not in the best social interest of some population groups. Titmuss
illustrates this concept with policies surrounding education. He asks if it is possible to
compare the outcomes for policies related to “the provision of two years of nursery
education for a three-year old” and policies for “the provision of two years' post-graduate
study for someone reading for a PhD” (Titmuss, 1975)(p. 52)? This question illustrates
the point that policy context should be considered when measuring and evaluating
specific outcomes.
With the recent work of Esping-Andersen (1990, 1999a), we are offered a more
expansive welfare state typology that builds on Titmuss’s initial work (Esping-Andersen,
1990; Esping-Andersen, 1999a). Gøsta Esping-Andersen proposed three types
[regimes] of welfare states: Liberal (Nations that exhibit market-driven policy such as the
United States), Conservative (Nations that exhibit status-reinforcing policy such as
Germany) and Social Democratic (Nations that exhibit progressive redistribution policy
such as Sweden and Finland) (Esping-Andersen, 1999a). Similar to Titmuss’s model,
Esping-Andersen’s regimes classify nations based on their response to areas of policy
development, such as decommodification. The overarching concept used in the
development of the three regimes is decommodification. Decommodification is defined
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as the process of providing a program or service as a matter of [social] right while at the
same time, allowing an individual to maintain a financial livelihood independent of labor
market interaction (p.22). In other words, decommodification is said to occur when the
specific universal social benefit provided secures the economic security for an individual
independent of the volatility of the labor market. Each of the three regimes exhibits
certain policy characteristics in relation to the interaction of the state[nation], market,
and family.
A nation classified as a liberal regime in the typology heavily relies on meanstested assistance. Examples of this regime are the United States and Australia. Liberal
regime policy limits universality and decommodification with the use of entitlement
programs that have limited benefits and strict entitlement qualifications. In comparison
to the other two regimes, liberal regimes provide the least amount of decommodification
to individuals and constrain the development of social rights. Social assistance
programs in these nations tend to affect low income individuals and maintain them at, or
just above, the poverty line. Liberal regimes strongly encourage the use of the private
market to provide economic security.
In contrast, conservative regimes, such as Germany, France and Italy, adhere to
a strong class structure relative to social policy. Social policy is developed with the
intent on preserving the “traditional family” whose male head is the primary
breadwinner. Conservative regime’s policy responses to social needs typically maintain
an individual’s employment status and thereby, maintain social class standing in
society. These types of policies frequently disenfranchise females and link their
economic security to their male spouse. For example, a male physician receives a
retirement pension that maintains his previous economic and social status in the
community. Upon his death, his wife would continue receiving his pension to maintain
the social status of the physician’s household.
Finally, social-democratic regimes, such as Sweden and Norway, promote strong
universalistic beliefs of citizen equality and develop social policies that highly
decommodify individuals. Nations fitting this regime typically expand social rights
through policy development and service provision. “Equality of the highest standards”
(p. 27) is the term Esping-Andersen uses to typify the main characteristic of this regime.

26

Although Finland is considered a social-democratic regime in the literature, EspingAndersen found Finland to be problematic regarding its regime classification. His
treatment of Finland often resulted in its absence from discussions of the socialdemocratic regime. Esping-Andersen’s negation of Finland along with that of other
researchers lends support for this research because it is possible that Finland was
never clearly classified (Kangas & Palme, 1989).
Esping-Andersen’s typology builds on the previous work of Marshall, Briggs, and
Titmuss in its conceptualization of the welfare state as labor market independent
(economic security) via the intervention of social policy. He utilizes what he deems “a
common textbook” definition of a welfare state. The basic premise of his definition is
that there is a responsibility of the state[nation] to provide some predetermined
minimum level of subsistence. This definition expands the view held by Briggs (1961)
because Esping-Andersen’s definition gives the state[nation] more power resulting in a
greater responsibility to all citizens. In the first chapter of his book, The Three Worlds of
Welfare Capitalism, Esping-Andersen expands his study into the welfare state by
submitting two questions for the welfare state policy debate: (1) Will the salience of
class diminish with the extension of social citizenship? (2) What are the causal forces
behind welfare-state development? He also expands on the work of Marshall (1950) in
terms of nation-building, economic modernization, and the development of extensive
welfare states, which he argues will ideally reduce inequality across populations by
redistributing resources across the entire population.
Viewing state[nation] power in any form as time-based and linear limits the
generalizability of any theory of welfare state development. As Esping-Andersen states
“it is problematic to hold that a numerical increase in votes, unionization, or seats will
translate into an expansive welfare state” (p.17). The welfare state is not just a
mechanism that intervenes to correct inequality structures; it is a system stratification
that can aid in ordering social relations (Briggs, 1961). I suggest that the ordering of
social relations can be significantly affected by correcting inequalities in the population
income distribution. In doing so, social policy development becomes a critical element
in this process.
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Esping-Andersen’s concept of decommodification relates to Marshall’s (1950)
concept of social rights because a nation’s level of decommodification can be translated
in terms of the extent to which social rights have been developed in that nation. The
three regimes relate to Briggs’s three goals in terms of the level of decommodification
and subsequent regime classifications reflect a nation’s response to each of the three
goals described previously. Finally, as previously discussed, Esping-Andersen’s three
regimes expand Titmuss’s two-pronged model into a three-regime model using the
construct of decommodification instead of a nations’ social policy response. Whereas
Titmuss classified nations based on their use of market forces or social redistribution,
Esping-Andersen classifies nations based on the economic security outcome,
decommodification, in a nation.
Critiques of Esping-Andersen’s Typology
As briefly discussed in chapter one, critiques of Esping-Andersen’s typology are
extensive. They range from an initial foray of critical book reviews to more recent
research discussing the typology in terms of gender/ethnic issues and criticizing the
basic development of the typology. Noted problems and limitations include: 1) a
singular concentration on social insurance provisions and the simultaneous neglect of
personal social services as contributing to social welfare; 2) the attention on the state
[nation] and capital market as the sole provider of social welfare to individuals, which
neglects the role of civil societal institutions, e.g., families, in providing additional social
welfare; 3) failure to incorporate the societal role of women in the development of the
typology regimes; and 4) the potential for misclassification given shifts in current
economic and social policy (Arts & Gelissen, 1999).
Jensen (1999) provides a discussion on the shortcomings of Esping-Andersen’s
typology in terms of lacking the ability to target population sectors versus the total
population (Jensen, 1999). He suggests that the weaknesses of Esping-Andersen's
typology result from the attempt to develop a general theory of the welfare state, and
argues a “sectoral”, i.e., micro, perspective is more useful. A micro perspective is more
useful because different social actors (gender, age cohorts) have varying sociopolitical
interests and are affected by welfare state social provision in different ways. This
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approach is particularly important in comparative analyses to provide a more
comprehensive view of the location of specific inequalities (Jensen, 1999).
The advent of work by researchers including Paul Pierson, John Myles, and Jill
Quadagno suggests that Esping-Andersen’s typology may not encompass the current
fiscal and political situation in many OECD nations. For example, it may not encompass
contemporary Finland. Myles and Quadagno (1997) modify Esping-Andersen’s
typology by suggesting that the advent of retrenchment (Pierson, 1994) is causing a
convergence within the typology regimes among different European nations. They cite
a “downward drifting trend line in the quality, generosity, and coverage of public
entitlements is common among all [OECD] countries, irrespective of partisan ideologies
or the balance of political forces (p. 264)” as the reason for this possible convergence
(Myles & Quadagno, 1997). Other research suggests that the social democratic and
conservative regimes are more likely to converge due to the limited role of PAYG
pension systems found in these regimes (Pierson, 1997). However, these discussions
are in the context of policy changes and no empirical evidence is offered.
The limited role of women in the development of Esping-Andersens’ typology has
also been extensively addressed in the literature. Ann Orloff, Julia O’Connor, Diane
Sainsbury, Debra Street, Jay Ginn, and Sara Arber have been at the forefront of
gender-based research regarding welfare state development. Their research has
offered gender-sensitive alternatives to Esping-Andersen’s three regimes typology.
Ann Orloff suggests in a survey of the literature on gender relations and the
welfare state that current typologies fail to capture the full complexity of policy variation
in terms of uniformity of effect and a linear dimension of variation. She further suggests
that comparative research suffers from an inadequate theorization of the political
interests of gender (Orloff, 1993). This conclusion is supported by research that
suggests more generous [welfare] state provisions are required to shift older adult
women out of a future of increasing later-life poverty (Ginn & Arber, 1993).
Orloff (1996) also examines the mutual effects of state social provision and
gender relations and develops a conceptual framework for analyzing the gender content
of welfare provision. She suggests that the additional dimensions of “access to paid
employment and capacity to form and maintain an autonomous household” should be
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included in the development of any welfare state typology to account for gender
relations within the provision of social welfare (Orloff, 1996).
O’Connor (1993) expands this discussion by integrating class, citizenship, &
gender in a comparative approach to welfare state regimes. She suggests that
incorporating gender into the development of welfare state typologies requires that the
woman’s household role be integrated with the labor market and state[nation]
(O'Connor, 1993). It is asserted that the role of women must be configured into the
concept of citizenship in order to remedy historical inequalities. This reconfiguration
places greater importance on female personal autonomy than previous analyses of the
welfare state, e.g. Esping-Andersen (1990), because previous studies ignore the
relationship between class, gender, and racial stratification as companions of the
welfare state (O'Connor, 1996).
More recently, Diane Sainsbury has criticized Esping-Andersen’s typology for
lacking a component for non-working women in the development of his typology
regimes (Sainsbury, 1999). She argues that women were only included in the
development of Esping-Andersen’s typology if they were in the paid labor market and
suggests that “this is problematic because women’s participation in the labour market
cannot be equated with access to work-related benefits” (p.77). Sainsbury argues that
to overcome these shortcomings, policy needs to be gender-constructed and legislation
developed on gender relations. She offers a modified typology of a male breadwinner,
separate gender roles, and individual earner-caregiver as three gender-sensitive worlds.
Sainsbury’s 1999 book, Gender and Welfare State Regimes, also expands
O’Connor’s (1996) discussion of autonomy. She suggests entitlement is a determining
and crucial factor in the contribution of social benefits and services to female autonomy.
Her empirical analysis reveals that female status in the labor market produces gender
stratification regarding access to benefits. This is the result of the assumption that the
“primary breadwinner” in the household is male. It is argued that a redistributive
strategy that combines flat rate benefits with earnings-related benefits steers clear of a
forced choice between providing adequate and equal benefits for men and women.
Recent welfare reforms that attempt to be gender neutral are found to be largely
unsuccessful in reducing gender stratification. While welfare retrenchment has occurred

30

since the 1980s, downsizing strategies that maintain the basic citizenship and residence
bases of entitlements uphold women's social rights, at least more so than other
strategies (Sainsbury, 1999).
In addition, Sainsbury argues that mainstream research has a preoccupation with
paid work and income maintenance and that care and service provision is not entered
into the welfare state equation. She argues that Esping-Andersen’s regimes vary in
response to gender-based policy issues. Conservative welfare states (Germany in this
research) have been extremely reluctant to equate care and domestic services with
work or fixed social benefits. Liberal regimes have a doctrine of minimal government
intervention in family life and structure and rely on means-tested programs. In contrast,
heavy state intervention is occurring in social-democratic regimes. Ginn, Street, and
Arber’s 2001 book Women, Work and Pensions has added empirical evidence to the
gender-based critique of welfare state research and Esping-Andersen’s typology. The
book presents a collection of work reflecting the status of women and pension reform in
several nations. The overall perspective is that while attempts have been made to
respond to gender inequality relative to pension benefits and economic well-being in
retirement, recent policy responses to retrenchment may produce less successful
outcomes in the future for females (Ginn et al., 2001).
It is concluded from the critiques of Esping-Andersen’s (1990) typology that there
is a need for gender and age-based micro analysis. Having outlined the problem and
provided a theoretical context, we turn next to a more detailed description of the
development of the pension system in Finland.
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Chapter Three
The Case of Finland
History of Finnish Pension Policy
The first pension scheme in Europe was developed in Germany in 1889. Many
other European countries also created pension schemes in the late 19th century.
Finland, however, has been considered a “social laggard” relative to pension system
development (Alestalo, 1986). Indeed, Finland was the very last European country to
develop a pension scheme (1937), a circumstance that may reflect its late 19th and early
20th century agrarian economy (Salminen, 1994).
Over the course of the 20th century, the Finnish government has legislated policy
modifications in a series of phases (See Table 3.1). A brief chronology of this
legislation includes: inception of a universal pension scheme in 1937, modification of
this universal pension scheme in 1956, introduction of an earnings-related pension
scheme in 1961, legislation of survivor pensions in 1969, introduction of partial pensions
and early pensions in 1986, the amendment of survivor pensions to include widowers in
1990, and further amendments of universal and earnings-related pensions in 1994,
1996 and 1998. This chapter will provide a brief description of these legislative
milestones.
Table 3.1 Timeline of Finnish Pension Legislation
1937

1956

1961

1969

1986

1990

1994, 1996, 1998

Universal
pension

Modification
of universal
pension

Earningsrelated
pension

Survivor
pensions

Partial
and early
pensions

Amendment
of survivor
pension

Amendment of both
universal and
earnings-related
pensions

National Pension Act of 1937
The National Pensions Act was based on the idea of individual savings accounts,
which were justified by reference to the idea that saving would promote the financially
and educationally solid principle of self-help. The emphasis laid on self-help reflected
the ideas of classical liberalism, then prevalent in Finland, which stressed responsibility,
willingness to save, and individual initiative (Salminen, 1994).
The National Pensions Act transpired from the recommendation of the
Committee on Old Age and Invalid Insurance commissioned in 1908 (Niemela &
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Salminen, 1995a). The passage of the final legislation was delayed until 1937 because
of the political climate in Finland between the two major political parties and the
instability of European governments as a result of World War I. The Committee on Old
Age and Invalid Insurance proposed a statutory pension insurance to cover all
employees in Finland except civil servants. This exclusion was suggested because civil
servants were covered under a separate social insurance plan. Pensions in Finland
were conceived as social instruments to provide minimum subsistence in the event of
work incapacity and old age. The Committee on Old Age and Invalid Insurance also
recommended that administration of the system be given a strong democratic basis as
this would ensure popular support. Consequently, the committee proposed that the
administration of the pension system be placed under parliamentary supervision. Thus,
the committee emphasized the idea of national unity and believed that a system based
on providing minimal levels of subsistence for all workers would promote social
cohesion among the working population and future retirees (Salminen, 1994; Timonen,
2001). The national pension system was shaped as far as possible on the basis of the
private insurance model. This insurance model included the principle of individual
savings linking benefits and invested contributions. National individual retirement
accounts were further envisaged as a means of promoting a savings ethic among the
working population (Niemela & Salminen, 1995a).
Despite the committee’s report and proposals by various political parties, social
provision in Finland in the 1920s and early 1930s was still mainly organized on the
basis of municipal poor relief. This municipality empowering ideology created a 29-year
impasse before political and economic events would occur to allow passage of the
national statute. The end of the “Great Depression”, a more tranquil political
environment and, beginning in the mid-1930s, brisk economic growth made it possible
to implement a statutory pension system by means of the National Pensions Act of 1937
(Brody, 1995). The Act emerged from a coalition government formed by the politically
liberal Social Democrats and the conservative Agrarian Party, who were able to find a
compromise on the content of a National Pensions Act covering the whole population.
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National Pension Act of 1957
Post-war inflation has been cited as the main reason for the failure of the
individual savings model as the foundation of the 1937 National Pension System Act
(Niemela & Salminen, 1995a). As a result, the nature of the system changed from
insurance to the care principle. A reform of the national pension systems was
undertaken in 1956 and passed in 1957. This reform was proposed during a post-war
change of both economic and domestic policies within Finland. There are several
examples of these changing policies. First, rationing, which had continued for nearly 10
years after World War II, finally ended in 1955. Second, the Finnish working population
instituted a general strike in March 1956 in protest for increased wages (Brody, 1995).
Third, a national presidential election was held in January 1956 carrying the possibility
of a shift in political parties. All these factors influenced the 1956 national pension
reform political discussion. The end result was a failed compromise between the main
government parties, the Social Democrats and the Agrarians (wage earners and
farmers). As a result, the 1957 national pension reform proposal was introduced to the
parliament in a still unrefined form at the beginning of 1956 as the government was
unable to mediate among the various interest groups. This resulted in parliament
stripping national pensions of the link to previous earnings, thus making them incometested and flat-rate benefits, although the original government proposal had been
crafted as a compromise between the farmers and wage-earners. PAYG (paying each
year’s pensions with current contributions) replaced full funding as the mechanism for
financing national pensions. The adoption of flat-rate pensions can be seen as an
indication of the strong conservative political position of the farmers, which was further
reinforced by the general workers’ strike.
The modified National Pensions Act was put into effect in 1957. Thirty years
later, in the late 1980s, this law, somewhat reformed, was still the basis of Finland's
National Pension Plan, a plan that was open to all residents over the age of sixteen,
even those who had never paid into it. Even foreigners not from the Nordic countries
were entitled to this pension if they had resided in Finland for at least five years. Those
who left for residence in a country outside Nordic Europe, even those who were Finnish
citizens, could receive the pension for only one year. The flat-rate national pension
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could be paid as either an old-age pension (once a person reached the age of sixtyfive); a full or partial invalid pension (to those between the ages of sixteen and sixty-four
who were no longer able to work); or as a long-term unemployment pension (to
unemployed persons in their late fifties or early sixties) (Salminen, 1994). In addition to
these classes of beneficiaries, survivors of those eligible for national pensions who were
not themselves independently eligible for the pensions could receive pensions under the
terms of the Survivor's Pension Plan. Also tied to the National Pension Plan were
payments for handicapped children living at home and for some combat veterans of
World War II.
National pensions were indexed, and they increased in value each year. Since
reforms of the early 1980s, national pensions were not taxable if they were the sole
source of income. Pensions were no longer affected by a spouse's earnings or pension
income, and the national pension could only be reduced by income from other pensions.
The National Pension Plan was funded by the beneficiary's own contributions, about 2
percent of his or her locally taxable income, and by employer contributions of 4 to 5
percent of the insured person's wages.
Employee Pension Plan Act of 1961
The Employees' Pensions Act was passed in 1961 to supplement the National
Pension Plan. While this National Pension Plan was adequate for rural Finnish people
(a majority of the population until the 1960s), it provided inadequate benefits to sustain
urban Finns given higher costs of living (Niemela & Salminen, 1995a). During the
1970’s, other compulsory wage-related pension plans were enacted into law for
temporary employees, for national and local government employees, for those working
for a state church, and for the self-employed. At the end of the decade, a supplementary
plan was created for farmers as well. Seamen had received an income-based plan
since 1956, and, as of 1986, those active in freelance professions such as acting and
writing also obtained coverage. These employment pension plans were completely
funded by the employers, private or public, who paid contributions, equal on the
average to about 10% of a worker's earnings, into funds managed by seven large
insurance companies or who set up funds on their own. Self-employed persons had to
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choose a fund. The Central Pension Security Institute was responsible for keeping
records about employment and benefits.
The normal age of pensionable retirement was sixty-five, and the pension paid
was based on the average earnings one had received in the most recent four years of
work ending two years before retirement (Tracy, 1979). One could receive up to 60% of
private-sector earnings and up to 66% of public-sector earnings. Older employees, at
work before these pension plans became effective, were guaranteed a minimum
pension of at least 29% of previous income if they retired before 1975, and 37% of
previous income if they retired after this date. Like the national pension, wage-related
pensions were indexed, and they increased each year. In addition, there were
provisions relating to disability, early or late retirement, and survivors' benefits similar to
those in effect for the National Pension Plan.
Survivor Pension Act of 1969
In 1969, the Finnish government enacted legislation for the provision of survivor
pensions. In effect, this legislation linked an individual’s pension to the marital unit
rather than just the individual. For example, when a pensioner dies, the surviving
spouse has the choice of receiving the deceased pensioner’s remaining pension or
his/her own. This legislation represented an expansion of the welfare state in Finland.
Partial Pension and Early Pension Act of 1986
During the economic recession in Finland in the mid-1980’s, legislation was
enacted to provide mechanisms to receive partial and early pensions. This legislation
was an attempt to reduce the pension burden on the Finnish welfare state by reducing
the number of people receiving a full pension during retirement (Salminen, 1994).
These changes in social policy were examples of legislation designed to slow down or
reduce the expansion of social-welfare expenditure (Alber, 1988; Alber, 1994).
Retrenchment: Amendments to the Universal and Earnings-Related Pensions in
1994 and 1996
Pension benefits were reduced during the early 1990’s. These reductions were
aimed mainly at decreasing the actual number of people receiving a pension. The 1994
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legislation to change the method of pension indexation was an attempt to slightly reduce
the number of pensioners. In addition, the limit for early retirement was raised and the
age limit for part-time pensions was lowered during 1994. This legislation reduced the
number of people eligible to receive a pension with the establishment of a minimumworking period and “future period” condition for the unemployment pension (Niemela &
Salminen, 1995a).
The national (universal) pension was legislated in 1957 to ensure minimum
economic security for pensioners who did not receive other pensions or whose other
pension security was below a minimal subsistence level. In 1996, legislation was
enacted which no longer entitled every citizen to a national (universal) pension. Since
1996, a person is only eligible to receive the national pension if the earnings-related
pension income exceeds a specific limit. However, separate pensions supplements can
be paid to recipients of the national pension whose income (including the national
pension) falls below a minimal subsistence level (European Commission. Directorate
General for Employment and Social Affairs. Unit E.2, 2000)
The outcome of these political processes and trends is the present Finnish
pension system. This system still consists of a universal component, an earning-related
component, and a survivor’s component. Detailed information on the structure,
eligibility, and benefits within the Finnish Pension System is provided in Appendix A.
Current Pension Reform Status
I conclude this chapter with a summary of the current status of pension reform in
Finland and its relationship to Esping-Andersen’s typology. Several features of the
pension system discourage employment of the working-age population and, if left
unchanged, will seriously aggravate the aging impact on the Finnish population.

While

the existing schemes for early retirement may have lessened the social impact of the
recession in the 1980’s, if early retirement remains the norm rather than the exception it
used to be, both current and future generations will have to pay the price. The
government and the related pension agencies (Central Pension Security Institute and
the Social Insurance Institute) have acknowledged this in past reform efforts and
ongoing discussions to further improve the pension system. Nevertheless, the system

37

contains a number of characteristics, introduced with good intentions, which effectively
defeat their purpose. For example, part-time pensions were introduced to keep people
in the work force who otherwise would have taken early retirement. However, by
enabling these "pensioners" to work part-time without losing much of their earnings and
none of their pension rights, part-time pensions provide strong incentives to lower,
rather than increase, working hours. The so-called unemployment pipeline to
retirement, by providing benefits at little loss to income and a ready path to the
unemployment pension at age 60, too often serves as a blanket discouragement to job
search, irrespective of a person's skills and chances of becoming reemployed. It also
provides a ready excuse for employers to lay off older workers. Indeed, under the
current system of financing unemployment pensions, larger firms face rising
contributions as the age of their employees increases, and also bear part of the direct
cost of unemployment and disability. This provides a strong disincentive for keeping or
hiring older workers. The same holds for disability pensions, traditionally the primary
channel into early retirement. The sheer number of disability pensioners suggests that
eligibility requirements may have been interpreted too generously relatively to the fiscal
cost to Finnish society.
Three other features of the pension system dramatically weaken incentives to
join the labor force early or participate in it until the statutory retirement age of 65 -further diminishing the attractiveness of a longer working life. These features also
imply that the benefits to those with shorter working lives are comparatively high at the
expense of those who work longer. First, pension rights accumulate only from the age
of 23, irrespective of when a person starts working, making early participation in the
labor force financially less attractive. Second, pension benefits are linked to earnings
over the last ten years of employment, implying an unduly large penalty for taking on a
lower paid job at later stages of the working life, while favoring people, often those with
better jobs and education, who have a steeper pay scale due to promotions later in their
career. Third, the cap on pension benefits at 60% of the so-called pensionable wage
can further diminish the attractiveness of a longer working life because there is no
benefit accrued from working longer at a similar salary.
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Particularly when the population is aging so rapidly, these incentive problems are
acute, prompting the Social Insurance Institute (KELA) to recommend urgent reforms.
These reforms, many of which are currently under active discussion between the
government and related pension agencies, focus on strengthening the link between
pension benefits and lifetime contributions and on removing the various elements of the
system that push older people out of gainful employment. To this end, a number of
measures, taken in combination, would seem to be most effective: (i) allowing the
accumulation of pension rights from the beginning of each person's working life; (ii)
abolishing the cap of 60% on pension rights along with the higher old-age accumulation
rate; (iii) introducing a more flexible retirement age within a reasonable range, taking
into account changes in life expectancy when determining pension benefits; (iv)
discontinuing the various subsidized schemes, such as part-time and unemployment
pensions, together with the "unemployment pipeline"; (v) enforcing strictly the eligibility
requirements for disability pensions; and (vi) reforming the financing system for
unemployment and disability pensions to eliminate the bias against hiring and keeping
older workers. The International Monetary Fund has strongly encouraged the swift
adoption of these reforms in time to influence the decisions of the aging "baby boomers”
in Finland.
It is critical to discuss at this point the manner in which trends in the Finnish
pension system relate to the welfare state status of Finland vis-à-vis Esping-Andersen’s
typology. Finland’s recent pension policy modifications may indicate an increasing
policy orientation away from full employment policies characteristic of a socialdemocratic regime. The question then becomes “In which direction is Finland moving?”
This pattern of policy change and subsequent fiscal outcomes in the Finnish Pension
system may parallel Finland’s inequality outcomes movement from a social-democratic
to a liberal or conservative regime within the framework of Esping-Andersen’s typology.
This research will use the Atkinson and Theil indices in concert to examine both crosssectional snapshots and longitudinal trends in inequality. As shown in Figure 3.1,
Finland may be shifting away from the social-democratic regime with respect to the
overall population or selected subpopulations. Finland may exhibit a new combination
of regime characteristic indicating a need for modification to the typology.
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With a deeper understanding of the current situation in Finland, we turn next to
the research design and methods employed for an empirical analysis, which sought to
investigate the manner in which Finland is changing with regard to its classification
within Esping-Andersen’s typology.
Figure 3.1 The Changing Welfare State Regime of Finland?

United States
Liberal

?

Sweden
Social
Democratic

?

Finland

?

Germany
Conservative

Adapted from Esping-Andersen’s (1990) Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism
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Chapter Four
Research Design and Methods
This chapter outlines the research design and methods employed for the
analysis. First, the research design is discussed in terms of a comparative analysis and
related 2001 field research on policy development conducted in Finland. Next,
information on data and policy sources is provided in detail followed by presentation of
technical considerations related to the statistical coding. Finally, four inequality
measurements, Lorenz curve, Gini, Atkinson, and Theil indices, are reviewed with a
subsequent discussion of the dual-index (Atkinson and Theil) analysis design used in
this research.
Research Design
This study utilizes the constant comparative method in cross-sectional and timeseries analyses to address the stated specific aims: to investigate the continuing
viability of Esping-Andersen’s welfare state typology at a national (macro) level with
respect to the case of Finland; to explore a new analytical approach by disaggregating
the population and conducting micro analyses incorporating considerations of gender
and age cohorts; and to examine the value of utilizing more sensitive inequality indices
(Atkinson and Theil) over the more commonly used Gini index.
Ragin (1994) defines the constant comparative method in his book Constructing
Social Research. The constant comparative method, originally developed by Glaser
and Strauss (1967), is defined as “a general technique used by qualitative researchers
to aid the formulation and clarification of concepts in the process of collecting data”
(Ragin, 1994, p. 185). This research adapts the constant comparative method to the
examination of Esping-Andersen’s typology by comparing exemplars of each regime
type with Finland across the variable income inequality. It has been argued that the
comparative method, when used with certain quantitative strategies, can approach the
“scientific rigor” of statistical or variable-based inquiry (Ragin, 1987). This method is
described extensively in analytic comparisons of inequality (Alber, 1994; Gornick,
Meyers, & Ross, 1998; Gran, 1997; Kalleberg, 1988; Kangas & Palme, 1989; Treas &
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Widmer, 2000); however, it is rarely named as a specific research method when used
by economists (Arkes, 1998; Bager-Sjogren & Klevmarken, 1998; Hoffmann, 1998;
Partridge, Rickman, & Levernier, 1996; Smeeding & Gottschalk, 1999; Wolff, 1996).
Additional quantitative analysis, the generation of confidence intervals, is used to
validate the specific income inequality indices used in the comparative discussion
(Ragin, 1994).
This research examines Finland in comparison with three other nations using the
‘most different’ strategy within a comparative context. The definition of this strategy is
counterintuitive from its name. The “most different” strategy is defined as the process of
detecting and comprehending patterns of similarity and difference among, in this case,
nations distinguished by different regime types (Castles, 1985, p. 5). Thus, if a similarity
across a specific inequality index is noted between Finland and Germany, then a regime
shift may be occurring. To conduct this research design, micro-level outcomes data for
Finnish pensioners are compared to micro-level outcomes data of a social democratic
nation (Sweden), a liberal nation (the United States), and a conservative nation
(Germany) as defined by Esping-Andersen’s typology. This research design places
Finland at the center of the comparison while benchmarking Finland against nations
categorized within the Esping-Andersen’s typology in order to examine potential regime
shifts as described in Chapter 3 (See Figure 3.1).
Income Inequality Data Source
The availability of the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) comparative database
provides a wonderful opportunity to analyze the research questions proposed in this
dissertation. This database consists of harmonized cross-national microdata on income
for 25 countries. Three or four waves of data are available for most of these countries.
As a result, this source is widely acknowledged to be the best international comparative
source for cross-sectional and longitudinal trend analyses of income distribution. LIS
data are the source of the majority of empirical evidence on comparative income,
poverty, inequality estimates, and other economic indices of well-being among OECD
nations in recent decades. For a detailed presentation of the data and the national data
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sources used see (Atkinson, Rainwater, & Smeeding, 1995) or the LIS homepage at
http://www.lisproject.org/dataccess.htm.
LIS data are used to conduct a comparative analysis between Finland (a social
democratic nation) and Sweden (another nation defined as social democratic by EspingAndersen), between Finland and Germany (a conservative nation), and between
Finland and the United States (a liberal nation). The data cover the period from the
early 1980s to the mid-1990s. Because LIS data do not include annual observations,
there is a slight cross-national variation in the years in which observations are recorded
and incorporated in the definition of waves by LIS for each country. The selection of
countries for inclusion in the comparative analysis was based on two criteria. The first
criterion was the practical concern of data availability. Second, and more important, an
array of countries was selected to represent the three welfare state regimes classified in
Esping-Andersen’s typology (Esping-Andersen, 1990).
The following analysis compares Finland data from Wave II (1987), Wave III
(1991), and Wave IV (1995) with all waves of data for the United States, Sweden, and
Germany (See Table 4.1). Finland utilizes only three datawaves because data for
Wave I were unavailable. However, the use of only three datawaves for Finland still
meets the current research standard for analyzing time-series trends. “Trends of
income distribution are analyzed by comparing static distributions at generally three
points in time” (Forster, 2000)(p.72). Wave I was used for the United States, Sweden,
and Germany to provide an earlier baseline and more comprehensive within-country
trend analysis for these nations.
United States data observation years are consistent with Finland for Wave III
(1991), but are one year earlier for Wave II (1986) and Wave IV (1994).

The Swedish

data observation years are consistent with Finland for Wave II (1987) and Wave IV
(1995), but are one year later for Wave III (1992). The German data observation years
also exhibit cross-national variation in observation year. Wave II (1984) for Germany is
three years earlier than Wave II (1987) for Finland. Wave III (1989) for Germany is two
years earlier than Wave III (1991) for Finland. Wave IV (1994) for Germany is one year
earlier than Wave IV (1995) for Finland.
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Table 4.1 LIS Dataset Information for Comparison Nations

LIS Code
Finland

FI

Wave I
ca. 1980
Unavailable

Wave II
ca. 1985
1987

Wave III
ca. 1990
1991

Wave IV
ca. 1995
1995

Germany

GE

1981

1984

1989

1994

Sweden

SW

1981

1987

1992

1995

United States

US

1979

1986

1991

1994

Adapted from Luxembourg Income Study website data information.
http://www.lisproject.org
The official data survey sources differ for each nation and some datawaves.
Data for Finland for all three waves (1987, 1991, and 1995) were collected from the
Finnish Income Distribution Survey (Luxembourg Income Study (LIS), 1997). This
survey is a registry-based population survey administered by Statistics Finland in
Helsinki. The survey samples generated by Statistics Finland were subsequently
harmonized and weighted for household size to match the overall population by LIS for
inclusion in the LIS database. Data for Germany in 1981 were collected from the
German Transfer Survey, while German data for the remaining waves (1984, 1989, and
1994) were collected from the German Socio Economic Panel Study (Luxembourg
Income Study (LIS), 1997). Both surveys are administered by Statistics Germany in
Berlin and collected by LIS via The German Institute for Economic Research. The
survey samples were subsequently harmonized and weighted for household size to
match the overall population by LIS for inclusion in the LIS database. All datawaves for
Sweden (1981, 1987, 1992, and 1995) were collected from the Swedish Income
Distribution Survey (Luxembourg Income Study (LIS), 1997). This survey is
administered by the Swedish Central Bureau of Statistics in Stockholm. The survey
samples were subsequently harmonized and weighted for household size to match the
overall population by LIS for inclusion in the LIS database. Finally, all datawaves for the
United States were collected from the March Current Population Survey (Luxembourg
Income Study (LIS), 1997). This survey is administered by the United States Census
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Bureau in Washington, DC. The survey samples were subsequently harmonized and
weighted for household size to match the overall population by LIS for inclusion in the
LIS database.
In July 1999, I attended the Annual Luxembourg Income Study Workshop. The
pre-doctoral workshop was seven days long and provided comprehensive training on
the use of the LIS database in comparative income distribution research. The workshop
provided a forum for young scholars to discuss research ideas with key LIS personnel
and provided a social venue to build collegial relationships for future collaborative
research. This workshop was a critical component in the development of this research.
It facilitated locating expertise on the LIS data.
Sources of Information on Pension Policy
National policy on pension programs and regulations for Finland and selected
comparison nations was provided from governmental websites of the respective
nations, various OECD reports, various book chapters, and journal articles on public
policy (See Table 4.2).
Additional information and translations of non-English material for Finland were
provided by expert colleagues in the Department of Social Policy at the University of
Turku, Finland, namely Dr. Ollie Kangas, Dr. Veli-Matti Ritakallio, Ms. Susan
Kuivalainen, and Ms. Tiina Makinen. These colleagues are all familiar with the LIS data
and many have attended or given lectures at selected LIS research workshops offered
each summer by the CEPS/INSTEAD Institute in Luxembourg. I also was fortunate to
meet with Dr. Heikki Niemela, of the Finnish Social Insurance Institute and Dr. Kari
Juhani Salminen, of the Finnish Central Pension Institute. Dr. Neimela is the Finnish
Pension Minister and Dr. Salminen is the Finnish Pension Historian. Both individuals
were instrumental in my ability to locate documents on the development of the Finnish
pension system.
During late May through early June 2001, I conducted a fact-finding trip to
Finland. Arrangements were made with the University of Turku, Department of Social
Policy in Turku, Finland to be received as a visiting scholar from the University of
Kentucky. The purpose of the trip was to discuss my research and issues surrounding
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Finnish pension policy with leading pension experts and researchers in the country.
The visit consisted of several interviews with policymakers, and national pension
Table 4.2 Sources of Information on Pension Policy
OECD pension reform reports (Forster,
2000; Kalisch & Aman, 1997; Kalisch et
al., 1998)
Taylor-Gooby book Welfare States
under Pressure (Taylor-Gooby, 2001)
Niemela and Salminen reports on
Pension Schemes (Niemela &
Salminen, 1995a; Niemela & Salminen,
1995b)
Comparative Scandinavian Pensions
(Salminen, 1994)
National Government
Websites
(http://thomas.loc.gov)
(http://government.fi)
(http://www.sweden.gov.se/)
(http://eng.bundesregierung.de)
World Bank and International Monetary
Fund reports
(Chand & Jeager, 1996; Hemming,
1998; Holzmann, 1999; Kopits, 1997;
Masson & Mussa, 1995)
European pension reports
(European Commission, 1999;
European Commission on Financial
Services, 1999)
Social Security Administration
(http://www.ssa.gov)
20th Century Foundation
(http://www.tcf.org)

Finland

Sweden

Germany

United States

!

!

!

!

!

!

!

!

!

!

!

!

!

!

!

!

!

!

!

!

!

!

!

!

!
!

officials both in Turku and Helsinki. In conjunction with this visit, arrangements were
made to interview a Swedish colleague, Eero Carroll, at the University of Stockholm.
This interview consisted of questions and discussions surrounding differences between
Finland and Sweden’s recent pension policy reforms and implementation. Policy
information for the United States was obtained through both print and web media.
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Examples of these sources include the Social Security Administration, the 20th Century
Foundation, and the OECD. Policy information for Germany was also obtained through
print and web media, including material from the OECD and Taylor-Gooby’s (2001)
book Welfare States under Pressure (Taylor-Gooby, 2001).
Technical Considerations
This section presents methodological issues and resulting decisions with respect
to analysis of the data. These methodological issues include: the definition of income
and income inequality; population coverage; equivalence scale usage; data weighting;
top and bottom coding; missing value and zero value management; unit of analysis, and
specific statistical code usage. Disposable Personal Income (LIS aggregate income
variable DPI) was used as the analytic measure of income and the basis of data on
income inequality for this research. Population coverage of the selected LIS data
consisted of all surveyed households and their family members. An equivalence scale
was used to calculate comparable income measures for all datasets. I used the OECD
equivalence scale [square root of the number of persons in the household], which is
standard procedure in LIS analyses (Smeeding & Gottschalk, 1999).
Since the analysis was focused on the incomes of older adults, the data were
weighted by applying the household weight (LIS variable HWEIGHT) multiplied by the
number of people over 65 in the sample (LIS variables NUM6574 and NUMGE75).
Weighting for the number of older adults allows for the calculation of the inequality
indices to reflect all older adults in the samples regardless of their household location.
In other words, the data are weighted to account for all older adults in the samples
whether they live in a single-family household as head of household; with a spouse; with
a roommate; or live with their children. In addition, weighting procedures allow for the
samples to take on the analytic characteristics of the entire population. Missing values,
negative and zero incomes were excluded from the analysis as is standard procedure
for LIS analyses (Atkinson et al., 1995; Smeeding & Gottschalk, 1999; Smeeding,
O'Higgins, & Rainwater, 1990). Although the LIS technical bulletin provides
comparability warnings for some of its datasets, the datasets chosen for this analysis
had no warnings issued and are comparable within the context of the inequality indices

47

interpretations. The final technical consideration is the unit of analysis. This research
uses the LIS household surveys for each nation’s datawave adjusted for older adults.
The unit of analysis is the individual older adult within the household.
Program Descriptions
Two Stata 6.0 statistical programs were employed to analyze the LIS data at the
aggregate and disaggregated (gender, age, age by gender) level. The programs are
briefly described below. A full example of the statistical code for data replication is
provided in Appendix B.
Ineqdeco
The ineqdeco Stata 6.0 program estimates a range of inequality and related
indices commonly used by researchers. In addition, inequality decompositions of a
subset of these indices by population subgroup are calculated. Inequality
decompositions by subgroup are useful for providing inequality "profiles" at a point in
time, and for analyzing secular trends. Micro level data, such as the LIS data, are
required to use this program (Jenkins, 1999).
Ineqerr
The ineqerr Stata 6.0 program computes the Theil entropy index and bootstraps
estimate of their sampling variances, i.e., confidence intervals. The program offers
three variations of the bootstrap variance: Normal, Bias-corrected, and Percentile. I
selected the normal variation because the LIS data are harmonized. The default value
of 100 was used to generate the number of bootstrap repetitions. Bootstrap replications
for this program are generated using a simple-stage, simple random draw on the
respective samples (Jolliffe and Krushelnytskyy, 1999).
Inequality Measures
The measurement of inequality is not an exact science by any assessment
(Cowell, 2000; Mitchell, 1991). Researchers have numerous indices from the field of
econometrics at their disposal. Unfortunately, there is no template of suitability relative
to either the type of analysis or data format. All inequality measures are generated from
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similar income data and are justifiable in a comparative analysis. The overall opinion of
researchers is that the ultimate decision is left to each individual researcher based on
his/her specified needs (Mitchell, 1991; Smeeding et al., 1990).
Independent of the plethora of inequality measures available to the researcher,
the issue of inequality as an issue of concern relative to pension viability and EspingAndersen’s typology should be addressed. In other words, why do we care about
income inequality? There are several reasons. First, in the context of the development
of social rights and the welfare state in general, it can be argued that income inequality
would be lower or eliminated altogether in nations with highly developed social rights
and high levels of decommodification. Second, relative to pension viability, income
inequality can affect the pension policy debate. Pension policy modifications may be
unduly influenced by individuals or groups with higher incomes because of their access
to legislators, thus disenfranchising certain income groups from the political process and
decreasing their economic security and economic well-being.
The measurement of welfare state outcomes has developed as extensively as
the income inequality literature itself. Over the years, economists have used a variety of
measures to determine the amount of inequality in an income distribution. Some of
these are commonly used, although rudimentary, statistical measures of dispersion.
However, researchers have developed others for the specific purpose of estimating the
degree of inequality. The most commonly used income inequality measures include:
The Lorenz curve, the Gini coefficient, the Theil index, and the Atkinson index (Atkinson
et al., 1995; Cowell, 2000; Jenkins, 1991; Mitchell, 1991; Smeeding, 1991; Smeeding et
al., 1990). In this section, the analytic property of each measure will be addressed and
where appropriate, research advantages and/or limitations of each will be presented as
basic guidelines for analysis.
Lorenz Curve
The Lorenz curve is the most basic measure of income distribution and related
inequality (Cowell, 2000). It is graphically represented as a diagram showing the
cumulative percentage of national income received (or percentage of national
expenditures paid) by a certain percentage of individuals or households. Thus, if all
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individuals or households have equal shares of income (20% of households have 20%
of the national income), the “curve” is actually represented as a 45° line. However, this
ideal situation is never achieved in society, so the Lorenz curve actually deviates from
the perfect equality 45° line. The closer the Lorenz curve is to the perfect equality line,
the lower the level of inequality in that population. The purpose of the Lorenz curve is to
depict the difference of actual income or expenditures from perfect equality among
individuals or households (Cowell, 2000; Mitchell, 1991). Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.2
show an unequal and equal depiction of the Lorenz curve, respectively.
Figure 4.1 Unequal Lorenz Curve
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Figure 4.2 Equal Lorenz Curve

Gini Index
The Gini coefficient compensates for non-dominant Lorenz curve comparisons by
creating a ranking statistic (Milanovic, 1997). Non-dominance occurs when
comparisons are made between different income distributions and the Lorenz curves
intersect meaning that the Lorenz curves do not show any dominant ordering (See
Mitchell 1991, p.107). For this reason, the Gini Index is closely related to the Lorenz
curve (Mitchell, 1991). This measure estimates the area between the Lorenz curve of
perfect equality (the 45° diagonal line) and another Lorenz curve reflecting a certain
amount of inequality (the bowed line). In simplest terms, it is calculated by dividing the
area within the Lorenz curve and the diagonal line (A) by the total area under the
diagonal line (A+B). Thus, the formula is A/(A+B) (Cowell, 2000). Figure 4.3 shows the
calculation of the Gini Index in graphic form. The Gini Index is a measure of dispersion
(also referred to as concentration) within a group of values, calculated as the average
difference between every pair of values divided by two times the average of the sample.
Thus, the larger the Gini coefficient, the higher the degree of dispersion and greater
inequality within the measured population.
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Changes in the Gini index are most sensitive to income transfers occurring in the
middle of the income distribution because it is based on the Lorenz curve, which also
reflects the cumulative percentage of incomes received by households. This concept is
defined as income transfer sensitivity (Jenkins, 1991). Calculations of the Gini Index for
distributions where income transfers have occurred at either of the extremes of the
distribution are misleading because the coefficient will not accurately reflect the correct
income concentration (Atkinson, 1970).
Figure 4.3 Gini Calculation shown with the Lorenz Curve

Several researchers have attempted to modify the Gini coefficient for use in other
analyses. Riese (1997) interpreted the Gini-index as a measure of the goodness of
prediction even though it was not established as a general member of the family of
these measures. However, he demonstrated that it could be used in certain
applications of survival analysis (Riese, 1997). The Gini index also has been modified
to measure the significance of any observed change in inequality. Blackburn (1989)
accomplished this by modifying the Gini coefficient calculation. He redistributed a
constant income amount from every household below the median income level to every
household above the median income level (Blackburn, 1989). Theoretically, this
modification provides a temporal equalizer for multiple income distributions and allows
for better comparative research analysis. The Gini coefficient also has been used in
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income convergence research (Iacoviello, 1996), and has been decomposed in a
manner similar to the Theil index (Yao, 1999).
Atkinson Index
The Atkinson index was created to correct a problem caused by both nondominant Lorenz curves and transfer sensitivity inherent in the Gini coefficient
(Atkinson, 1970). The equations is:

1

1
I A ( F ) := 1 −
[ ∫ x1−ε dF ( x)]1−ε (Cowell, 2000, p.
µ (F )
ε

115), where x is the individual income of an observation, F is the income distribution of
the entire measures population, and ε is the inequality aversion parameter. This
problem is rectified because of a characteristic unique to the Atkinson Index. Using the
Atkinson Index, the researcher can actually control for income inequality sensitivity, i.e.,
where the most transfer-sensitive area in the income distribution can be pre-determined
for the analysis. This selection control statistic is represented by the Greek letter
epsilon (ε). As epsilon rises, the index becomes more sensitive to changes occurring in
the lower end of the income distribution. Overall, the Atkinson measure provides the
potential for better interpretation of the actual location of income transfers within the
distribution (Ryscavage, 1999). Jenkins (1991) has provided an additional interpretation
of epsilon. He discusses the Atkinson Index in terms of the “equally distributed
equivalent income” meaning the total national income which, if equally distributed,
would be “just as good” as the actual income distribution measured (p.28). The
argument inherent in this description is that caring about inequality at all requires some
tradeoff in national income to reduce the income inequality. The value selected for
epsilon in the analyses determines the level of “inequality aversion” acceptable to the
population.
It has been suggested that the application of Atkinson's social welfare approach
to the analysis of intercountry inequality is a natural extension of recent research
(Firebaugh & Gibbs, 1985; Fritzell, 2001). By setting epsilon (ε) at different values, we
can compare trends in intercountry inequality based on different assumptions about the
relative welfare impact of income transfers. The larger the ε, the more heavily the index
is weighted by the lower end of the income distribution (Jenkins, 1991). Thus, by
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comparing trends in intercountry inequality for different values of ε, we can determine
the extent to which conclusions about trends in intercountry inequality depend on the
relative weight given to the lower and upper ends of the income distribution (Firebaugh,
1999). For this research, epsilon has been set to ε=.5, which is a moderate level of
inequality aversion to allow for comparison to other LIS analyses. Epsilon ranges from
0 to 2.0 in most research. However, epsilon could have been set at different levels for
each of the four nations by making certain assumptions about each nation’s welfare
state policy. For example, the Swedish analysis could have been conducted with ε=2
because the Swedish welfare state exhibits high income redistribution through taxation.
Theil Index
The Theil index is used to construct inequality measures for temporally
inconsistent income distributions (Theil, 1967). The Theil equation is:
I Theil ( F ) := − ∫

X
X
log(
)dF ( x) (Cowell, 2000, p. 109), where x is the individual
µ (F )
µ (F )

income of an observation, and F is the income distribution of the entire measures
population. If the distribution units (individuals, households, etc.) are grouped in
mutually exclusive groups, overall inequality can be separated into both a between and
within-group component for analysis. Neither the Gini Index nor the Atkinson Index
allow for income inequality decomposition. The Theil index measures greatest
sensitivity with income transfers within lower income households, which is similar to the
situation when the variance of the natural logarithm is used. As discussed in the
previous section, the selection of ε=.5 for the Atkinson Index also increases the
Atkinson Index’s sensitivity to lower income households, thus creating a similarity to the
Theil Index. In addition, the more critical feature of the Theil Index in this research is
the ability to generate confidence intervals for the coefficient. Confidence intervals can
be generated for the Theil index, thus increasing the validity of the coefficients at crosssectional time periods. In contrast to the Atkinson Index, there is no intuitive
interpretation for the specific Theil coefficient or its resulting longitudinal change (Wolff,
1997). Interpretation of changes over time must be kept in a broad context.
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As shown by the range of research measures described in this section, there is
no consensus on a single preferred measure of inequality (Mitchell, 1991; Ryscavage,
1999). One possible explanation for this incongruity is the complex nature of income
inequality as an analytic topic. The examination of several measures offers researchers
a simple solution to this dilemma, thus providing a more representative interpretation.
This solution also is a critical point for policy analysts and government officials because
the location of the inequality may drive policy. Misinterpretation of the inequality can
have detrimental effects on certain income groups because of erroneous policy
decisions. Concurrently, Mitchell (1991) suggests that the sheer scope of analytic tools
creates inherent inequality measurement challenges for the researcher. However, she
emphasizes that each measure is “equally applicable in a comparative context” (p.105).
This implies that significant caution be taken in measurement tool selection because the
“nature of inequality trends often depends on the measure being used” (Morris,
Bernhardt, & Handcock, 1994). Researchers must develop individual modeling
techniques based on the specific type of inequality being analyzed. This research will
compare outcomes from two indices (Atkinson and Theil) across the selected nations
and data subpopulations.
Analyses
In the following chapters, analyses for this research are undetaken in two
phases. Phase I (Macro) encompasses several steps. First, sample sizes were
reviewed to determine subgroup classifications (age groups, gender, education, etc.) for
calculating the Atkinson and Theil indices. Second, LIS data for the selected countries
were examined for missing data and income variables were chosen to enter into the
calculation of the respected indices. Currently, the statistical syntax code used to
calculate both the Atkinson and Theil indices utilizes a specific aggregated income
variable (disposable personal income) within the LIS data.
Phase II of the analysis (Disaggregation) consisted of submitting batch Stata
code to the LIS server to calculate the Atkinson and Theil Waves I-IV of the selected
nations’ data. The analysis matrix is presented in Table 4.3. The dual-index approach
provides a more robust measure of income inequality because the interpretability of the
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Atkinson Index is combined with the bootstrap confidence interval estimates generated
for the Theil Index.
Separate analyses using different coefficients allows for a more complete
comparison of Finland with the United Sates, Germany and Sweden because the
analysis generates multiple measures with different empirical qualities. Each measure
is compared across each nation selected. Strengths and weaknesses of each
Table 4.3 Research Analysis Matrix
Nation

Micro
Age & Gender

Macro
Overall

Atkinson Theil Atkinson Theil
Finland

I

CI

I

CI

United States

I

CI

I

CI

Germany

I

CI

I

CI

Sweden

I

CI

I

CI

I = Interpretable
CI = Confidence Interval
measure are discussed relative to classifying nations using Esping-Andersen’s typology
as well as offering possible modification to Esping-Andersen’s existing typology from the
research findings that will incorporate current economic and political movements such
as retrenchment.
We turn next to the presentation of results. Results will be presented over the
course of three chapters: Chapter Five will present results from the macro analysis;
Chapter Six will present results from the micro analysis; and Chapter Seven will present
results from the generation of confidence intervals for the Theil Index.
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Chapter Five
Macro Analysis Results
This chapter describes the macro analyses of data for each country (United
States, Germany, Sweden and Finland) using older adult poverty levels as well as the
aggregate Atkinson and Theil indices of income inequality. Descriptions are given for
within-country trends and the relative change over time in comparison to Finland. The
overall sample size (number of individuals) for each national datawave is presented in
Table 5.1. One caveat is that the German samples are smaller than the other three
nations. Also, the United States sample increased three-fold for Wave IV because the
U.S. Census Bureau collected more date in the Current Population Survey.
Table 5.1 Sample Size for Each Datawave (Individuals within Households)
Finland
Sweden
Germany
United States

Wave I
NA
1008
600
2894

Wave II
1721
1137
844
2471

Wave III
1611
1755
691
3179

Wave IV
1312
4488
1095
12523

The level of inequality change over time (cardinal measure) is categorized using
a scale developed by OECD economists and presented in Table 5.2 (Forster, 2000).
Table 5.2 OECD Trend Level Scale
Level of change in inequality trend

Percentage point range

Significant rise
Rise
Modest Rise
No Change
Modest decrease
Decrease
Significant decrease
Adapted from Forster (2000, p. 74)

More than +12 points
+7 to +12 points
+2 to +7 points
-2 to +2 points
-2 to -7 points
-7 to -12 points
More than -12 points

In addition, the Pearson correlations between the Atkinson and Theil coefficients
for the overall population and subpopulations for all nations are presented in Table 5.3
Correlations between Atkinson and Theil Indices below. As shown, the indices are
highly correlated, which supports the use of the dual-indices analytic approach to this
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research (Mitchell, 1991). The confidence intervals generated for the Theil indices will
lend validity to the interpretation of the corresponding correlated Atkinson indices.
Table 5.3 Correlations between Atkinson and Theil Indices
Data Category
Overall
Male Cohort
Female Cohort
65-74 Age Cohort
75+ Age Cohort
Male 65-74 Cohort
Female 65-74 Cohort
Male 75+ Cohort
Female 75+ Cohort

Correlation
0.989
0.994
0.994
0.992
0.982
0.996
0.987
0.982
0.988

Within Nation Analysis
United States
Over the four waves of the United States data (1979-1994) in the Luxembourg
Income Study, the proportion of United States older adults who were living in poverty as
measured by reporting disposable personal income below 50% of median income
(Sainsbury, 1999) actually decreased from 27.30% in Wave I (1979) to 20.60% in Wave
IV (1994) (See Figure 5.1).
The majority of the decrease (27.30% to 20.80%) occurred between Wave I
(1979) and Wave III (1991) with only a slight decrease between Wave III (1991) and
Wave IV (1994) from 20.80% to 20.60%. Overall, the United States appears to be
reducing the proportion of poor elders in society. However, the inequality coefficients
show a contradictory inequality trend. While the aggregate numbers of older adults in
poverty (measured by less than 50% of median income) is declining, their share of
national income is also decreasing.
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Figure 5.1 Proportion of Elders in Poverty (Below 50% Median Income)
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For the United States data, the Atkinson coefficient increases (See Figure 5.2).
Between 1979 and 1991, there is a slight, but steady, absolute increase from .190 to
.204. This translates to no change in inequality using the OECD trend level scale.
Between Wave III (1991) and Wave IV (1994), there is a stabilization of the coefficient.
Overall, this translates to a 7.73% increase in the e-weighted (See Chapter Four
discussion) Atkinson Index from Wave I to Wave IV.
The interpretation of the Atkinson index for wave-specific coefficients indicates
that for Wave I (1979) if incomes were completely equal, only 81.02% of current
national income would be required to achieve the same level of social welfare (as the
current national income is currently distributed). However, for Wave IV (1994) if
incomes were completely equal, 79.56% of current national income would be required
to achieve the same level of social welfare (as the current national income is currently
distributed) indicating an increase in income inequality. It is important here to expand
the explanation of the Atkinson Index. For example, for the wave-specific interpretation
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of Wave I for the United States, if we were to place a perfectly equal income distribution
(Atkinson Index = 0.00) on top of the actual income distribution for this wave, then only
81.02% of national income is being used to generate this “perfect equality”. Therefore,
the remaining 19.88% of national income is being unequally distributed somewhere in
the population and that percentage of national income would have to be relinquished to
create perfect income equality in this population. In other words, the nation is only
willing to spend 81.02% of national income to achieve income equality.
Although we are unable to calculate the exact location of the inequality, i.e.,
where the inequality exists in this analysis, it is unlikely that the remaining 19.88% of
nation income is improving the income status of either the poor or middle class older
adults. Finally, when we compare the change over time between Waves I (1979) and IV
(1994) for the Atkinson Index, we find that United States society needs to give up an
additional 1.47% (81.02% - 79.56%) of national income to achieve complete equality.
Thus, there is an increase of 1.47% in national income being distribution unequally in
the population over this time period, so the nation is willing to give up slightly less
national income in the reduction of inequality.
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Figure 5.2 Overall Atkinson Index (e-weighted)
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The Theil coefficient exhibits a less stable trend over the same time period (See
Figure 5.3). Between Waves I and IV (1979-1994) there is a modest increase in the
overall e-weighted Theil Index of 12.98% (.199 to .225). However, there is a decline of
8.54% between Waves II (1986) and III (1991), which translates as effectively no
change in inequality under the OECD scale. Though the proportion of older adults in
poverty decreased over the data time periods, the overall trend in inequality as with the
Atkinson Index is one of greater inequality for older adults in the United States. There is
no intuitive interpretation of the Theil index other than the direction of the change. One
possible explanation for the decline in the Theil coefficient for Wave III is that the
income variable which contributes to the inequality for the remaining waves is not
represented in the Wave III cases. This is a situation where the Atkinson and Theil
indices do not replicate wave-specific outcomes at the macro level for the United States.
Thus, any interpretation of the dual-index approach at this specific cross-sectional level
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should be done with caution because the validity of the Theil index may not lend itself to
an interpretation of the Atkinson as the indices exhibited opposite trends. However,
overall trends are replicated in LIS data with both indices.
Figure 5.3 Overall Theil Index by Country (e-weighted)
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Germany
Over the time period of the data (1981-1994), the proportion of German older
adults who were living in poverty (less than 50% of median income) decreased from
14.36% in 1981 to 6.97% in 1994 (See Figure 5.1). Germany also recorded a
decreasing Atkinson coefficient (See Figure 5.3). Between Waves I and IV (1981-1994)
there is a modest decrease of 18.65% (.123 to .100).
The interpretation of the Atkinson index for wave-specific coefficients indicates
that for Wave I (1981) if incomes were completely equal, only 87.69% of current
national income would be required to achieve the same level of social welfare (as the
current national income is currently distributed). However, for Wave IV (1994) if
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incomes were completely equal, 89.99% of current national income would be required
to achieve the same level of social welfare (as the current national income is currently
distributed) indicating a decrease in income inequality. This means that between
Waves I (1981) and IV (1994), German society was willing to give up 2.30% more
national income to reduce inequality.
Between Waves I and IV (1981-1994) there is a hyperbolic decrease in the
overall e-weighted Theil Index of 20.75% (.130 to .103). Again, as for the United States
Wave III data, the income variable which contributes to the inequality for the remaining
waves may not be represented in the Wave II cases. This is a situation where the
Atkinson and Theil indices do not replicate trend outcomes at the macro level for
Germany.
Sweden
Over the time period of the data (1981-1995), older adults in Sweden living in
poverty exhibit a hyperbolic trend (See Figure 5.1). This percentage increased from
2.89% in 1981 to 7.22% in 1987 and then decreased to 2.71% between 1987 and 1995.
The Atkinson coefficient trend is similarly hyperbolic, although less pronounced, to the
pattern of older adults living in poverty. Sweden has a trend toward inequality with
modest transition between Wave I (1981) and Wave II (1987) because the e-weighted
overall Atkinson Index increases 78.25% (.036 to .065). The intracountry inequality
change possibly could be explained by the recession in Sweden during the mid-1980s.
It should be noted that Sweden’s coefficients are much less than those in the other
measured countries; therefore, Sweden still exhibits the lowest inequality in comparison
with these countries while the intracountry inequality exhibits a more volatile trend.
Because the coefficients are small in comparison to the other nations, a negligible
absolute increase can translate as a large relative percentage change.
The interpretation of the Atkinson index for wave-specific coefficients indicates
that for Wave I (1981) if incomes were completely equal, only 96.37% of current
national income would be required to achieve the same level of social welfare (as the
current national income is currently distributed). However, for Wave IV (1995) if
incomes were completely equal, 93.84% of current national income would be required

63

to achieve the same level of social welfare (as the current national income is currently
distributed) indicating an increase in income inequality. This means that between
Waves I (1981) and IV (1995), Swedish society was willing to give up 2.53% less
national income to reduce inequality.
Between Waves I and IV (1981-1995) there is a hyperbolic increase in the overall
e-weighted Theil Index of 81.99% (.038 to .697). The Atkinson and Theil indices
replicate outcomes at the macro level for Sweden with the Theil coefficients being
slightly larger.
Finland
Over the time period of the data (1987-1995), older adults in Finland living in
poverty exhibit a sharp hyperbolic trend with an overall decrease (See Figure 5.1). The
percentage of older adults living in poverty increased from 11.9% in 1987 to 13.9% in
1991 and then decreased substantially to 5.2% between 1991 and 1995. The Atkinson
coefficient trend is similarly hyperbolic, but less pronounced, to the pattern of older
adults living in poverty. Finland has an overall trend toward equality with negligible
increase between Wave II (1987) and Wave III (1991) with respect to the measured
coefficients. The e-weighted overall Atkinson Index increased 8.62% between Waves II
and III (.076 to .086). However, it should be noted that Finland’s coefficients, like
Sweden’s, are much less than those in the other measured countries; therefore, Finland
still exhibits low intercountry inequality in comparison while the intracountry inequality
exhibits a more volatile trend. The intracountry inequality change possibly could be
explained by macro economic events in Finland during the late 1980’s as there were no
significant pension policy changes implemented during that period.
Interpretation of the Atkinson index for wave-specific coefficients indicates that
for Wave II (1987) if incomes were completely equal, only 92.42% of current national
income would be required to achieve the same level of social welfare (as the current
national income is currently distributed). However, for Wave IV (1995) if incomes were
completely equal, 92.17% of current national income would be required to achieve the
same level of social welfare (as the current national income is currently distributed)
indicating a negligible increase in income inequality. This means that between Waves II
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(1987) and IV (1995), Finnish society was willing to give up 0.25% less national income
to reduce inequality.
Between Waves II and IV (1987-1995) there is a hyperbolic decrease in the
overall e-weighted Theil Index of 4.09% (.086 to .083), which is different than the
Atkinson index outcome for Finland at the macro level. However, this difference may be
the result of the algorithmic differences inherent to the indices.
Relative Change between Finland and Comparative Nations
As discussed in Chapter four, the Theil Index provides a more robust measure of
inequality because of the validity obtained with the generation of confidence intervals.
However, the index is more difficult to interpret. Therefore, the Atkinson Index is used
for discussions of within-nation trends. The Theil Index and related discussion will be
presented for the relative change between nations for both the overall population and
subsequent disaggregated subpopulations (gender, age cohort, and age cohort by
gender).
Finland vis-à-vis United States. Relative to the overall e-weighted Theil index,
the United States and Finland are diverging over the timeframe of these datasets (See
Figure 5.4). What this means is that Finland’s outcomes at the macro level are not
replicating those of a liberal nation as classified by Esping-Andersen. The Three
Worlds of Welfare Capitalism is valid at this level of analysis because the liberal and
social-democratic regimes remain distinct relative to their inequality outcomes.
Finland vis-à-vis Germany: Relative to the overall e-weighted Theil index,
Germany and Finland reveal a convergence over the time period of these datasets (See
Figure 5.4). Finland’s outcomes at the macro level are possibly replicating those of a
conservative nation as classified by Esping-Andersen. The Three Worlds of Welfare
Capitalism may need modification at this level of analysis. An alternative explanation is
that Germany is actually approaching the Social-Democratic regimes because
Germany’s income inequality level is higher than Finland’s across the time periods.
Therefore, the reduction in Germany’s macro level inequality may indicate that the
conservative and social-democratic regimes are converging into what I will term a
Continental or “Euro” regime instead of a movement to or from the social-democratic
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regime. A “Euro” regime would imply that EU member nations are beginning to have
convergent inequality outcomes.
Finland vis-à-vis Sweden: Relative to the overall e-weighted Theil index,
Sweden and Finland are converging over the timeframe of these datasets (See Figure
5.4). What this means is that Finland’s outcomes at the macro level are still replicating
those of a social-democratic nation as classified by Esping-Andersen. The Three
Worlds of Welfare Capitalism remains valid at this level of analysis because
comparative nations within the social-democratic regime replicate inequality outcomes.
This evidence also lends support to the argument that at the macro level of analysis, the
conservative regime may either be shifting into or converging with the social-democratic
regime.
Figure 5.4 Overall Theil Index by Wave (e-weighted)
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Chapter Six
Micro Analysis Results
Within Nation Analysis
As we turn to micro level analyses, this chapter considers inequality variations
within each country by (a) gender; (b) age cohort; and (c) age cohort by gender, utilizing
the Atkinson index for intracountry comparisons and the Theil index for both intra and
intercountry comparisons. Discussions are presented for within-country results at the
micro level relative to the gender and age cohort-specific Atkinson and Theil indices as
well as the relative change over time in comparison to Finland for each subpopulation.
The sample size for each is presented in Table 6.1. The unit of analysis is the individual
within household. For example, Finland Wave II has 1721 individuals in the data, and
these 1721 individuals are comprised of 1099 males and 619 females. The remaining
subpopulations for Finland Wave II are disaggregated from the total 1721 individuals by
age cohort and gender by age cohort. Again, these samples are weighted by LIS to
reflect the composition of the total population of the respective nation.
Table 6.1 Sample Size for Dataset Subpopulations (Individuals within
Households)*
M

F

65-74

75+

M

M

F

F

65-74

75+

65-74

75+

Finland
II (N=1721)

1099

619

1123

598

775

324

348

271

III (N=1611)

1030

581

1051

560

754

297

276

284

IV (N=1312)

850

462

862

450

596

254

266

196

I (N=1008)

791

217

709

299

607

184

102

115

II (N=1137)

911

226

784

352

677

234

107

119

III (N=1755)

1385

370

1334

421

1106

279

228

142

IV (N=4488)

2788

1700

1793

2695

1401

1387

392

1308

Sweden
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Table 6.1 Sample Size for Dataset Subpopulations (Individuals within
Households)* (cont.)
Germany
I (N=600)

339

261

362

238

211

128

151

110

II (N=844)

461

383

491

353

303

158

188

195

III (N=691)

380

311

375

316

235

145

140

171

IV (N=1095)

589

506

696

399

432

157

264

242

I (N=2894)

1597

1297

1765

1129

1076

521

689

608

II (N=2471)

1361

1110

1460

1011

920

441

540

570

III (N=3179)

1836

1343

1850

1329

1212

624

638

705

IV (N=12523)

7135

5388

6870

5653

4446

2689

2424

2964

United States

*Individual cells may not add to the total N due to missing data
United States - Gender
Comparison of the overall Atkinson Index with the indices calculated for gender is
shown in Figure 6.1. For all waves of the United States data except Wave III (1991),
the Atkinson index for females is greater, thereby demonstrating more inequality than
for males. Over the course of the data, the trend for males exhibits a negligible (See
Table 5.2) increase in inequality (overall 6.54% or a .012 point increase). The trend for
females is more volatile across all data waves with a negligible overall increase in
inequality of 3.12% (.006 point increase). From Wave II (1986) to Wave III (1991), there
is a modest 11.61% (-.022 point) decrease in inequality for females. Using the OECD
Trend Level Scale (Table 5.2), this decrease is defined as “modest” because the
absolute difference in the time periods is between two and seven points. Throughout
this analysis, percentage changes may be substantial even though the scale classifies
such changes as modest or even, in some cases, negligible. However, this decrease
reverses from Wave III (1991) to Wave IV (1994) exhibiting a 12.73% (.022 point)
increase in female inequality. These results indicate that the share of national income
for United States older females has exhibited an modest overall decrease, with a brief
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period of improvement in the late 1980’s, while there has been a progressive, but less
pronounced, decline in income shares for older United States’ males.
Interpretation of the Atkinson index for wave-specific coefficients indicates that
females in the United States have consistently higher levels of inequality relative to
males and that it would take a larger redistribution of income to equalize the inequality.
For example, in Wave IV (1994), if incomes were completely equal, 81.28% of current
national income would be required to achieve the same level of social welfare for males
(as the current national income is currently distributed) compared to 80.20% of current
national income being required to achieve the level of social welfare for females,
meaning an additional 1.08% of national income is required for older United States
women to achieve the level of social welfare of males.
Figure 6.1 Atkinson Index (e-weighted) by Gender
0.25

0.20

Index

0.15

0.10

0.05

0.00
SW I

SW II

SW III

SW IV

FI II

FI III

FI IV

GE I

GE II

GE III

GE IV

US I

US II

US III

US IV

LIS Dataset
Atkinson E=1 (eweighted)

Atkinson M

Atkinson F

The gender-based Theil index for the United States data mostly replicates the Atkinson
results (See Figure 6.2). For all waves of the United States data, the Theil index for
females is greater, consistently demonstrating more inequality, than for males. Over the
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four waves of data (1979-1994), the trend for males is one of slightly increasing
inequality (overall 10.73%). The trend for females is more volatile across all data waves
with an overall increase in inequality of 3.54%. From Wave II (1986) to Wave III (1991),
there is a 13.52% decrease in inequality for females. However, consistent with the
results from the Atkinson Index, this decrease reverses from Wave III (1991) to Wave IV
(1994) exhibiting a 12.86% increase in female inequality. It should be noted that the
Theil coefficients replicate those of the Atkinson Index except in Wave III. For Wave III
(1991), the Theil index for males is lower than for females while results for the Atkinson
Index show the opposite relationship. However, the overall pattern of income
deterioration for females is consistent with the results from the Atkinson Index.
Figure 6.2 Theil Index (e-weighted) by Gender
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Germany - Gender
For all waves of the German data, the Atkinson index for females is greater than
for males, thereby demonstrating a higher level of inequality (See Figure 6.1). This
means that females as a subpopulation within Germany have a smaller share of income
than their male counterparts. Over the four waves of the data (1981-1994), the trend for
males is one of modest, but steadily decreasing, inequality (overall 32.54% or -.039
point decrease). The trend for female inequality is decreasing as well with a negligible
overall decrease in inequality of 3.07% (-.004 points). From Wave II (1984) to Wave III
(1989), there is a 5.53% (-.006 point) decrease in inequality for females. However, this
negligible decrease reverses from Wave III (1989) to Wave IV (1994) exhibiting a 7.43%
(.008 point) increase in female inequality. Within Germany, results from the Atkinson
Index show a progressive improvement in share of national income for males, while the
overall improvement in income share for German females may be eroding.
Interpretation of the Atkinson index for wave-specific coefficients indicates that
females in Germany have consistently higher levels of inequality relative to males and it
would take a larger redistribution of income to equalize the inequality. For example, in
Wave IV (1994), if incomes were completely equal, 91.97% of current national income
would be required to achieve the same level of social welfare for males (as the current
national income is currently distributed) compared to only 88.33% of current national
income being required to achieve the level of social welfare for females, meaning an
additional 3.64% of national income is required for older German females to achieve the
level of social welfare of males.
The gender-based Theil index for the German data offers slightly different results
than the results of the Atkinson Index analysis (See Figure 6.2). For the first two data
waves of the German data, the Theil index for females is less than that for males,
indicating less inequality among females for this time period. However, for Waves III
(1989) and IV (1994), female inequality is greater, demonstrating higher inequality, than
for males. Over the course of the data, the trend for males is one of significantly
decreasing inequality (overall 33.51%). The trend for females is more volatile across all
data waves with an overall decrease in inequality of 1.90%. However, from Wave I
(1981) to Wave II (1984), there is an 11.70% increase in inequality for females. This
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increase reverses from Wave II (1984) to Wave III (1989) and Wave III (1989) to Wave
IV (1994) respectively exhibiting a 7.71% and 4.84% decrease in female inequality over
these time periods. It should be noted that the wave-specific Theil coefficients replicate
those of the Atkinson Index except in Wave I. For Wave I (1981), the Theil index for
males is lower than for females while results from the Atkinson Index show the opposite
relationship. Results from the Theil Index, consistent with the Atkinson Index, indicate
that the income situation for older German males has progressively improved.
However, the Theil index also indicates a slight improvement for older German females,
which is inconsistent with results from the Atkinson. This variation may be explained by
algorithmic difference in the calculation of the indices.
Sweden – Gender
For all waves of the Sweden data except Wave II (1987), the Atkinson index for
females is less than that for males, demonstrating lower inequality (See Figure 6.1).
Over the four waves of data (1981-1995), the trend for males is one of modestly
increasing inequality (overall 65.54% or .025 point increase) with a negligible reduction
of 3.12% (-.002 points) from Wave III (1992) to Wave IV (1995). The trend for females
is more volatile across all data waves with a modest overall increase in inequality of
82.44% (.021 points). From Wave II (1987) to Wave III (1992), there is a 22.87% (-.013
point) decrease in inequality for females. However, this negligible decrease reverses
from Wave III (1992) to Wave IV (1995) exhibiting an equally negligible 4.90% (.002
point) increase in female inequality. Within Sweden, results from the Atkinson Index
show a progressive deterioration in share of national income for both males and
females, with the income situation for females eroding at a slower pace.
Interpretation of the Atkinson index for wave-specific coefficients indicates that
females in Sweden have consistently lower levels of inequality relative to males and it
would take a larger redistribution of income to remove the inequality. For example, in
Wave IV (1995), if incomes were completely equal, 93.80% of current national income
would be required to achieve the same level of social welfare for males (as the current
national income is currently distributed) compared to 95.46% of current national income
being required to achieve the level of social welfare for females, meaning an additional
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1.66% of national income is required for older Swedish males to achieve the level of
social welfare of females.
The gender-based Theil index for the Sweden data mostly replicates the
Atkinson results for males, but exhibits a less volatile trend in inequality for females
(See Figure 6.2). For all waves of the Sweden data, the Theil index for females is less
than that for males, consistently demonstrating lower inequality for females. The trend
for males is one of slightly increasing inequality (overall 77.37%) with a moderating
reduction of 6.71% from Wave III (1991) to Wave IV (1994). The trend for females is a
steady increase in inequality (overall 101.65%). The majority of this increase (59.94%)
occurs from Wave I (1981) to Wave II (1987). The increase moderates over the
remaining time periods. There is a 6.32% increase in inequality for females from Wave
II (1987) to Wave III (1992) and an 18.58% increase from Wave III (1992) to Wave IV
(1995). Consistent with results from the Atkinson Index, the Theil Index indicates that
the income situation is worsening for both older males and females in Sweden with
older females fairing better than males over the time period.
Finland - Gender
For all waves of the Finland data, the Atkinson index for females is less than that
of males, demonstrating less inequality for females (See Figure 5.5). Over the three
waves of data, there is a hyperbolic inequality trend for males with a negligible overall
increase in inequality of 3.72% (.003 points). The trend for females is opposite to that of
the males across all data waves with a negligible overall decrease in inequality of 5.19%
(-.003 points). From Wave II (1987) to Wave III (1991), there is a 25.85% (.015 point)
increase in inequality for females. However, this negligible increase reverses from
Wave III (1991) to Wave IV (1995) exhibiting a 24.66% (-.018 point) decrease in female
inequality. Within Finland, results from the Atkinson Index show a slight improvement in
share of national income for older females, with the income situation for older males
slightly eroding.
Interpretation of the Atkinson index for wave-specific coefficients indicates that
females in Finland have consistently lower levels of inequality relative to males and it
would take a larger redistribution of income to equalize the inequality. For example, in
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Wave IV (1995), if incomes were completely equal, 92.95% of current national income
would be required to achieve the same level of social welfare for males (as national
income is currently distributed) compared to 94.55% of current national income being
required to achieve the level of social welfare for females, meaning an additional 1.60%
of national income is required for older Finnish males to achieve the level of social
welfare of females.
The gender-based Theil index trend for the Finland data replicates the Atkinson
results (See Figure 6.2). For all three waves of the Finland data, the Theil index for
females is lower, consistently demonstrating less inequality, than for males. Over the
three waves of data, there is a hyperbolic inequality trend for males with an overall
decrease in inequality of 4.90%. The trend for females is similar to that of the males
across all data waves with an overall decrease in inequality (overall 15.58%). From
Wave II (1987) to Wave III (1991), there is a 25.87% increase in inequality for females.
However, this increase reverses from Wave III (1991) to Wave IV (1995) exhibiting a
32.93% decrease in female inequality. Results from the Theil Index indicate that the
income situation is improving for both older males and females in Finland with older
females fairing better than older males over the time period. These results for older
Finnish males are inconsistent with results from the Atkinson Index. However, the slight
difference in the Wave IV (1995) coefficient for males may be explained by algorithmic
distinctions between the indices.
United States – Age Cohort
The comparison of the overall Atkinson Index with the indices calculated for age
cohort is shown in Figure 6.3. For Waves III (1991) and IV (1994) of the United States
data, the Atkinson index for age cohort 65-74 is less than for age cohort 75+, thereby
demonstrating lower inequality. Over the four waves of data, the trend for age cohort
75+ is one of modestly increasing inequality (overall 18.67% or .003 point increase).
The trend for age cohort 65-74 is more volatile across all data waves with a negligible
overall increase in inequality of 3.62% (.007 points). From Wave II (1986) to Wave III
(1991), there is a 7.74% (-.016 point) decrease in inequality for age cohort 65-74.
However, this negligible decrease reverses from Wave III (1991) to Wave IV (1994)
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exhibiting a 6.55% (.012 point) increase in age cohort 65-74. Within the United States,
results from the Atkinson Index show a decrease in share of national income for both
age cohorts, with the income situation for the 75+ cohort eroding at a faster pace.
The interpretation of the Atkinson index for wave-specific coefficients indicates
that in the more recent datawaves, the 65-74 age cohort in the United States has higher
levels of inequality relative to the 75+ cohort and it would take a larger redistribution of
income to remove the inequality. For example, in Wave IV (1994), if incomes were
completely equal, 80.15% of current national income would be required to achieve the
same level of social welfare for the 65-74 cohort (as the current national income is
currently distributed) compared to only 79.36% of current national income being
required to achieve the level of social welfare for the 75+ cohort, meaning an additional
0.79% of national income is required for the 75+ age cohort in the United States to
achieve the level of social welfare of their younger counterparts.
Figure 6.3 Atkinson Index (e-weighted) by Age Cohort
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The age cohort-based Theil index for the United States data replicates the
Atkinson results (See Figure 6.4). For Waves III (1991) and IV (1994) of the United
States data, the Atkinson index for age cohort 65-74 is less than for age cohort 75+,
thereby demonstrating lower inequality. The trend for age cohort 75+ is one of
increasing inequality (overall 25.08%). The trend for age cohort 65-74 is more volatile
across all data waves with an overall increase in inequality of 6.58%. From Wave II
(1986) to Wave III (1991), there is a 7.75% decrease in inequality for age cohort 65-74.
However, this decrease reverses from Wave III (1991) to Wave IV (1994) exhibiting a
9.67% increase in inequality for age cohort 65-74. Consistent with the Atkinson Index,
results from the Theil Index indicate that the income situation is deteriorating for both
age cohorts in the United States with the 75+ cohort fairing worse over time.
Figure 6.4 Theil Index (e-weighted) by Age Cohort
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Germany – Age Cohort
For all waves of the German data except Wave III (1989), the Atkinson index for
age cohort 65-74 is less than that for age cohort 75+, demonstrating lower inequality for
age cohort 65-74 (See Figure 6.3). The trend for age cohort 75+ is one of modestly
decreasing inequality (overall 25.44% or -.035 point decrease). The inequality trend for
age cohort 65-74 is parabolic between Waves I (1981) and III (1989) with a negligible
overall decrease in inequality of 13.38% (-.015 points). From Wave II (1984) to Wave III
(1989), there is a 17.70% (.021 point) increase in inequality for age cohort 65-74.
However, this modest increase reverses from Wave III (1989) to Wave IV (1994)
exhibiting a modest 24.68% (-.032 point) decrease in age cohort 65-74 inequality.
Within Germany, results from the Atkinson Index show an improvement in share of
national income for both age cohorts, with the income situation for the 75+ cohort
improving more substantially compared with age cohort 65-74.
Interpretation of the Atkinson index for wave-specific coefficients indicates that
recently, the 65-74 age cohort in Germany have lower levels of inequality relative to the
75+ cohort and it would take a larger redistribution of income to equalize the inequality.
For example, in Wave IV (1994), if incomes were completely equal, 90.39% of current
national income would be required to achieve the same level of social welfare for the
65-74 cohort (as the current national income is currently distributed) compared to
89.79% of current national income being required to achieve the level of social welfare
for the 75+ cohort, meaning an additional 0.60% of national income is required for the
75+ age cohort in Germany to achieve the level of social welfare of their younger
counterparts.
The age cohort-based Theil index for the German data offers slightly different
results than the Atkinson Index analysis (See Figure 6.4). For the first two data waves
of the German data, the Theil index for age cohort 65-74 is less than that for age cohort
75+, indicating less inequality among age cohort 65-74 for this time period. However,
for Wave III (1989), inequality for age cohort 65-74 is greater than for age cohort 75+.
Over the course of the data, the trend for 75+ is more hyperbolic with an overall
inequality decrease of 24.29%. The trend for age cohort 65-74 is a steady increase
(20.06%) in inequality across data waves I (1981) - III (1989) with an overall decrease in
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inequality across all four waves of data of 18.82%. Consistent with the Atkinson Index,
results from the Theil Index indicate that the income situation is improving for both age
cohorts in Germany with the 65-74 cohort fairing worse over time.
Sweden – Age Cohort
For all waves of the Sweden data, the Atkinson index for age cohort 65-74 is
greater than that for age cohort 75+, demonstrating higher inequality (See Figure 6.3).
The trend for age cohort 75+ is one of modestly increasing inequality (overall 105.85%
or .030 point increase) with a negligible reduction of 18.00% (-.010 points) from Wave II
(1987) to Wave III (1992). The trend for age cohort 65-74 is less variable across all
data waves with an overall increase in inequality of 80.94% (.027 points). This modest
increase is large because Sweden’s coefficients are smaller at baseline, so very small
increases in the coefficient result in large proportional increases. From Wave II (1987)
to Wave III (1992), there is a 23.73% (.014 point) increase in inequality for age cohort
65-74. However, this negligible increase reverses from Wave III (1992) to Wave IV
(1995) exhibiting a 15.16% (-.011 point) decrease in inequality for age cohort 65-74.
Within Sweden, results from the Atkinson Index show a decrease in share of national
income for both age cohorts at a similar pace.
Interpretation of the Atkinson index for wave-specific coefficients indicates that
recently, the 65-74 age cohort in Sweden have higher levels of inequality relative to the
75+ cohort and it would take a larger redistribution of income to equalize the inequality.
For example, in Wave IV (1995), if incomes were completely equal, 93.97% of current
national income would be required to achieve the same level of social welfare for the
65-74 cohort (as the current national income is currently distributed) compared to
94.23% of current national income being required to achieve the level of social welfare
for the 75+ cohort, meaning an additional 0.26% of national income is required for the
65-74 age cohort in Sweden to achieve the level of social welfare of their older
counterparts.
The age cohort-based Theil index for the Sweden data mostly replicates the
Atkinson results for both age cohorts (See Figure 6.4). For all waves of the Sweden
data except Wave IV (1995), the Theil index for age cohort 65-74 is greater than that for
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age cohort 75+, consistently demonstrating more inequality among age cohort 65-74.
The trend for age cohort 75+ is one of increasing inequality (overall 126.09%) with a
moderating reduction of 6.75% from Wave II (1987) to Wave III (1992). Again, the large
percentage increase is a result of Sweden’s very small coefficients at baseline. The
trend for age cohort 65-74 is a steady increase in inequality (overall 87.63%) with a
20.55% inequality reduction between Wave III (1992) and Wave IV (1995). The majority
of this increase (84.91%) occurs from Wave I (1981) to Wave II (1987). The increase
moderates over the remaining time periods. There is a 27.72% increase in inequality
for age cohort 65-74 from Wave II (1987) to Wave III (1992). Consistent with the
Atkinson Index, results from the Theil Index indicate that the income situation is
deteriorating for both age cohorts in Sweden.
Finland – Age Cohort
For two of the three waves of the Finland data (the exception is Wave IV, 1995),
the Atkinson index for age cohort 65-74 is less than age cohort 75+, demonstrating less
inequality among age cohort 65-74 (See Figure 6.3). Over the three waves of data,
there is a moderate hyperbolic inequality trend for age cohort 65-74 with a negligible
overall increase in inequality of 15.71% (.011 points). The trend for age cohort 75+ is
similar to that of the age cohort 65-74 across all data waves with a negligible overall
decrease in inequality of 6.05% (.004 points). From Wave II (1987) to Wave III (1991),
there is a 19.05% (.014 point) increase in inequality for age cohort 65-74. However, this
negligible increase reverses from Wave III (1991) to Wave IV (1995) exhibiting a 9.17%
(-.002 point) decrease in age cohort 65-74 inequality. The 75+ age cohort exhibits a
larger, but still negligible, decrease (22.63% or .020 points) from Wave III (1991) to
Wave IV (1995). Within Finland, results from the Atkinson Index show slight
improvement in share of national income for both age cohorts.
Interpretation of the Atkinson index for wave-specific coefficients indicates that
recently, the 65-74 age cohort in Finland have lower levels of inequality relative to the
75+ cohort and it would take a larger redistribution of income to equalize the inequality.
For example, in Wave IV (1995), if incomes were completely equal, 91.79% of current
national income would be required to achieve the same level of social welfare for the
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65-74 cohort (as national income is currently distributed) compared to 93.29% of current
national income being required to achieve the level of social welfare for the 75+ age
cohort, meaning an additional 1.50% of national income is required for the 65-74 age
cohort in Finland to achieve the level of social welfare of their older counterparts.
The age cohort-based Theil index trend for the Finland data replicates the
Atkinson results (See Figure 6.4). For all waves of the Finland data except Wave III
(1991), the Theil index for age cohort 65-74 is greater, demonstrating more inequality,
than for age cohort 75+. Over the course of the data, there is a hyperbolic inequality
trend for age cohort 65-74 with a slight overall decrease in inequality of 0.64%. The
trend for age cohort 75+ is similar to that of the age cohort 65-74 across all data waves
with an even larger overall decrease in inequality of 7.38%. From Wave II (1987) to
Wave III (1991), there is a 14.26% increase in inequality for age cohort 65-74.
However, this increase reverses from Wave III (1991) to Wave IV (1995) exhibiting a
13.04% decrease in age cohort 65-74 inequality. Age cohort 75+ exhibits a larger
decrease (28.07%) from Wave III (1991) to Wave IV (1995). Consistent with the
Atkinson Index, results from the Theil Index indicate that the income situation is slightly
improving for both age cohorts in Finland.
United States – Age Cohort by Gender
Figure 6.5 shows the comparison of the overall Atkinson Index with the indices
calculated for age cohort 65-74 by gender. For all waves of the United States data, the
Atkinson index for females age 65-74 is greater, thereby demonstrating greater
inequality, than for males age 65-74. Over the four waves of data, the trend for males
age 65-74 is one of fluctuating inequality with a negligible overall increase of 5.79%.
The trend for females age 65-74 is similarly fluctuating with a negligible overall
decrease in inequality across all data waves of 1.07% (-.002 points). From Wave II
(1986) to Wave III (1991), there is a 13.58% (-.029 point) decrease in inequality for
females age 65-74. However, this modest decrease reverses from Wave III (1991) to
Wave IV (1994) exhibiting a 10.18% (.019 point) increase in inequality among females
aged 65-74. Within the United States, results from the Atkinson Index show a gradual
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decrease in the share of national income for males age 65-74, while females age 65-74
show a very slight increase.
Interpretation of the Atkinson index for wave-specific coefficients indicates that
recently, females age 65-74 in the United States have experienced higher levels of
inequality relative to males age 65-74 and it would take a larger redistribution of income
to remove the inequality. For example, in Wave IV (1994), if incomes were completely
equal, 81.64% of current national income would be required to achieve the same level
of social welfare for the males age 65-74 (as the current national income is currently
distributed) compared to 79.91% of current national income being required to achieve
the level of social welfare for females age 65-74, meaning an additional 1.73% of
national income is required for females age 65-74 in the United States to achieve the
level of social welfare of their male counterparts.
Figure 6.5 Atkinson Index (e-weighted) by Age Cohort (65-74) and Gender
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Figure 6.6 shows the comparison of the overall Atkinson Index with the indices
calculated for age cohort 75+ by gender. For all waves of the United States data except
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Wave III (1991), the Atkinson index for females age 75+ is greater, thereby
demonstrating more inequality, than for males age 75+. Over the four waves of data,
the trend for males age 75+ is parabolic with a modest overall increase in inequality of
5.79% (.023 points). The trend for females age 75+ is parabolic between Wave I (1979)
and Wave III (1991) with a reversal in Wave IV (1995) resulting in a modest overall
increase in inequality across all data waves of 12.21% (.021 points). Between Wave II
(1986) and Wave III (1991), there is an 11.84% (-.022 point) decrease in inequality for
females age 75+. However, this modest decrease reverses from Wave III (1991) to
Wave IV (1994) exhibiting a 17.26% (.028 point) increase in female ages 75+ inequality.
Within the United States, results from the Atkinson Index show a decrease in share of
national income for both genders aged 75+.
Interpretation of the Atkinson index for wave-specific coefficients indicates that
recently, the females age 75+ in the United States have higher levels of inequality
relative to their male counterparts and it would take a larger redistribution of income to
remove the inequality. For example, in Wave IV (1994), if incomes were completely
equal, 80.98% of current national income would be required to achieve the same level
of social welfare for males age 75+ (as the current national income is currently
distributed) compared to 80.89% of current national income to achieve this level of
social welfare for females age 75+, meaning an additional 0.10% of national income is
required for females age 75+ in the United States to achieve the level of social welfare
of their male counterparts.
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Figure 6.6 Atkinson Index (e-weighted) for Age Cohort (75+) and Gender
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The Theil index for age cohort 65-74 by gender for the United States data mostly
replicates the Atkinson results (See Figure 6.7). For all waves of the United States
data, the Theil index for females age 65-74 is greater, consistently demonstrating higher
inequality, than for males age 65-74. Over the course of the data, the trend for males
age 65-74 is one of fluctuating inequality but with an overall increase of 9.14%. The
trend for females age 65-74 is more volatile across all data waves with a very slight
overall decrease in inequality of 0.13%. From Wave II (1986) to Wave III (1991), there
is a 14.51% decrease in inequality for females age 65-74. However, this decrease
reverses from Wave III (1991) to Wave IV (1994) exhibiting a 7.67% increase in female
age 65-74 inequality. Consistent with the Atkinson Index, results from the Theil Index
show a gradual decrease in share of national income for both males and females aged
65-74.
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Figure 6.7 Theil Index (e-weighted) by Age Cohort (65-74) and Gender
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The Theil index for age cohort 75+ for the United States data also mostly
replicates the Atkinson results (See Figure 6.8). For two waves of the United States
data, Waves I (1979) and II (1986), the Theil index for females age 75+ is greater than
for males of the same age, demonstrating higher inequality. Over the four waves of
data, the trend for males age 75+ is one of slightly increasing inequality (overall
23.01%). The trend for females age 75+ is more volatile across all data waves with an
overall increase in inequality of 12.57%. From Wave II (1986) to Wave III (1991), there
is a 14.26% decrease in inequality for females age 75+. However, this decrease
reverses from Wave III (1991) to Wave IV (1994) exhibiting a 19.35% increase in female
age 75+ inequality. Consistent with the Atkinson Index, results from the Theil Index
show a decrease in share of national income for both genders age 75+.
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Figure 6.8 Theil Index (e-weighted) by Age Cohort (75+) and Gender
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Germany – Age Cohort by Gender
For all waves of the German data except Wave I (1981), the Atkinson index for
females age 65-74 is greater than for males age 65-74 (See Figure 6.5), thereby
demonstrating more inequality. Over the four waves of data, the trend for males age
65-74 is one of modestly decreasing inequality (overall 27.21% or -.031 points) with a
reversal from Wave II (1984) to Wave III (1989). The trend for females age 65-74 is
opposite with a modest overall increase in inequality of 30.13% (.029 points). From
Wave II (1984) to Wave III (1989), there is an 18.51% (.022 point) increase in inequality
for females age 65-74. However, this modest increase reverses from Wave III (1989) to
Wave IV (1994) exhibiting a 10.17% (-.014 point) decrease in female age 65-74
inequality. The interpretation of the Atkinson index for wave-specific coefficients
indicates that recently, females age 65-74 in Germany have higher levels of inequality
relative to their male counterparts and it would take a larger redistribution of income to
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remove this inequality. For example, in Wave IV (1994), if incomes were completely
equal, 91.85% of current national income would be required to achieve the same level
of social welfare for males age 65-74 (as the current national income is presently
distributed) compared to only 87.45% of current national income to achieve this level of
social welfare for females age 65-74, meaning an additional 4.40% of national income is
required for German females age 65-74 to achieve the level of social welfare of their
male counterparts.
For two waves of the German data, Waves I (1981) and IV (1994), the Atkinson
index for females age 75+ is greater than for males age 75+ (See Figure 6.6), thereby
demonstrating higher inequality. Over the four waves of data, the overall trend for
males age 75+ is one of modestly decreasing inequality of 39.87% (-.051 points). The
trend for female age 75+ inequality is decreasing as well with a modest overall decrease
of 27.54% (-.040 points). From Wave II (1984) to Wave III (1989), there is a 30.75% (.034 point) decrease in inequality for females age 75+. However, this modest decrease
reverses from Wave III (1989) to Wave IV (1994) exhibiting a 35.92% (.028 point)
increase in female age 75+ inequality. The interpretation of the Atkinson index for
wave-specific coefficients indicates that recently, females age 75+ in Germany have
higher levels of inequality relative to their male counterparts and it would take a larger
redistribution of income to remove this inequality. For example, in Wave IV (1994), if
incomes were completely equal, 92.34% of current national income would be required
to achieve the same level of social welfare for males age 75+ (as national income is
currently distributed) compared to 89.53% of current national income to achieve this
level of social welfare for females age 75+, meaning an additional 2.81% of national
income is required for German females age 75+ to achieve the level of social welfare of
their male counterparts.
The Theil index for age cohort 65-74 by gender for the German data offers
slightly different results than the results of the Atkinson Index analysis (See Figure 6.7).
For all data waves of the German data except Wave I (1981), the Theil index for
females age 65-74 is greater than that for males, indicating higher inequality among
females age 65-74 for this time period. Over the four waves of data, the trend for males
age 65-74 is one of decreasing inequality (overall 31.15%). The trend for females is
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opposite with an overall increase in inequality of 27.31%. However, from Wave III
(1989) to Wave IV (1994), there is a 28.92% decrease in inequality for females age 6574. This is a reversal from the trend between Wave II (1984) to Wave III (1989) and
Wave III (1989) to Wave IV (1994) respectively exhibiting a 51.75% and 18.03%
increase in female age 65-74 inequality over these time periods.
The Theil index for age cohort 75+ by gender for the German data replicates the
results of the Atkinson Index analysis (See Figure 6.8). For data waves I (1981) and IV
(1994) of the German data, the Theil index for females age 75+ is greater than that for
males, indicating higher inequality among female age 75+ for these time periods. Over
the four waves of data, the overall trend for males age 75+ is one of decreasing
inequality of 36.49% after a sharp increase (53.70%) from Wave I (1981) to Wave II
(1984). The trend for females age 75+ is similarly decreasing across all data waves
with an overall decrease in inequality of 25.85%. However, from Wave III (1989) to
Wave IV (1994), there is a 50.54% increase in inequality for females age 75+. This is a
reversal from the trend between Wave II (1984) to Wave III (1989) and Wave III (1989)
to Wave IV (1994) respectively exhibiting a 13.83% and 42.84% decrease in female age
75+ inequality over these time periods.
Sweden – Age Cohort by Gender
For all waves of the Sweden data, the Atkinson index for females age 65-74 is
less than that for males age 65-74, demonstrating lower inequality (See Figure 6.5).
The trend for males age 65-74 is one of modestly increasing inequality (overall 71.46%
or .025 point increase) with a negligible reduction of 4.32% (-.003 points) from Wave III
(1992) to Wave IV (1995). The trend for females age 65-74 is parabolic across all data
waves with a negligible overall increase in inequality of 77.79% (.016 points). This
finding may appear to be counterintuitive. However, while the percentage change is
larger for females age 65-74, the absolute change in the coefficient is interpreted as
negligible using the OECD trend scale. From Wave III (1992) to Wave IV (1995), there
is a 35.26% (-.019 point) decrease in inequality for females age 65-74. This negligible
decrease is a reversal from the previous trend from Wave I (1981) to Wave II (1987)
and Wave II (1987) to Wave III (1992) which exhibit 110.55% (.022 point) and 30.43%
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(.013 point) increases, respectively, in female age 65-74 inequality. The interpretation
of the Atkinson index for wave-specific coefficients indicates that recently, males age
65-74 in Sweden have higher levels of inequality relative to their female counterparts
and it would take a larger redistribution of income to equalize the inequality. For
example, in Wave IV (1994), if incomes were completely equal, 93.92% of current
national income would be required to achieve the same level of social welfare for males
age 65-74 (as the current national income is currently distributed) compared to 96.46%
of current national income being required to achieve the level of social welfare for
females age 65-74, meaning an additional 2.54% of national income is required for
Swedish males age 65-74 to achieve the level of social welfare of their female
counterparts.
For all waves of the Sweden data except Wave II (1987), the Atkinson index for
females age 75+ is less than that for males, demonstrating lower inequality (See Figure
6.6). The overall trend for males age 75+ is one of modestly, but steadily, increasing
inequality (overall 104.42% or .030 point increase) with a moderating reduction of
4.48% (.002 points) from Wave II (1987) to Wave III (1991). The trend for females age
75+ is highly volatile across all data waves with a modest overall increase in inequality
of 118.55% (.028 points). From Wave II (1987) to Wave III (1992), there is a 56.39% (.036 point) decrease in inequality for females age 75+. However, this modest decrease
reverses from Wave III (1992) to Wave IV (1995) exhibiting an 85.29% (.024 point)
increase in female age 75+ inequality.
The interpretation of the Atkinson index for wave-specific coefficients indicates
that recently, males age 75+ in Sweden have higher levels of inequality relative to their
female counterparts and it would take a larger redistribution of income to equalize the
inequality. For example, in Wave IV (1994), if incomes were completely equal, 94.22%
of current national income would be required to achieve the same level of social welfare
for males age 75+ (as national income is currently distributed) compared to 94.86% of
current national income being required to achieve the same level of social welfare for
females age 75+, meaning than only an additional 0.64% of national income is required
for Swedish males age 75+ to achieve the level of social welfare of their female
counterparts.
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The Theil index for age cohort 65-74 by gender for the Sweden data mostly
replicates the Atkinson results (See Figure 6.7). For all waves of the Sweden data, the
Theil index for females age 65-74 is less than that for males age 65-74, consistently
demonstrating lower inequality for females age 65-74. The trend for males age 65-74 is
one of increasing inequality (overall 81.46%) with a moderating reduction of 15.56%
from Wave III (1991) to Wave IV (1994). The trend for females age 65-74 is an
increase in inequality (overall 69.48%). The majority of this increase (98.45%) occurs
from Wave I (1981) to Wave II (1987). The increase moderates and begins to reverse
over the remaining time periods. There is a 23.15% increase in inequality for females
age 65-74 from Wave II (1987) to Wave III (1992) and a 30.65% decrease from Wave III
(1992) to Wave IV (1995).
The Theil index for age cohort 75+ by gender for the Sweden data mostly
replicates the Atkinson results for males age 75+, but exhibits a less pronounced trend
in inequality for females age 75+ (See Figure 6.8). For all waves of the Sweden data,
the Theil index for females age 75+ is less than that for males age 75+, consistently
demonstrating lower inequality for females age 75+. The trend for males age 75+ is
one of increasing inequality (overall 117.48%) with a moderating reduction of 10.46%
from Wave II (1987) to Wave III (1992). The trend for females age 75+ is an increase in
inequality (overall 155.08%). The majority of this increase (113.16%) occurs from Wave
III (1992) to Wave IV (1995).
Finland – Age Cohort by Gender
For all waves of the Finland data, the Atkinson index for females age 65-74 is
less than that of males, demonstrating lower inequality for females age 65-74 (See
Figure 6.5). Over the three waves of data, there is a trend of negligibly increasing
inequality for males age 65-74 with an overall increase in inequality of 16.07% (.011
points). The trend for females age 65-74 is hyperbolic across the three data waves with
a negligible overall increase in inequality of 22.77% (.012 points). From Wave II (1987)
to Wave III (1991), there is a 27.21% (.014 point) increase in inequality for females age
65-74. This negligible increase reverses from Wave III (1991) to Wave IV (1995)
exhibiting a 3.49% (-.002 point) decrease in female age 64-74 inequality, thus
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suggesting an improvement in the income status of this subpopulation. The
interpretation of the Atkinson index for wave-specific coefficients indicates that recently,
the males age 65-74 in Finland have higher levels of inequality relative to their female
counterparts and it would take a larger redistribution of income to equalize the
inequality. For example, in Wave IV (1994), if incomes were completely equal, 92.38%
of current national income would be required to achieve the same level of social welfare
for males age 65-74 (as the current national income is currently distributed) compared
to 93.75% of current national income being required to achieve the level of social
welfare for females age 65-74, meaning an additional 1.37% of national income is
required for Finnish males age 65-74 to achieve the level of social welfare of their
female counterparts.
For all waves of the Finland data, the Atkinson index for females age 75+ is less
than that of males, demonstrating lower inequality for females age 75+ (See Figure 6.6).
Over the three waves of data, there is a hyperbolic inequality trend for males with a
negligible overall decrease in inequality of 10.47% (-.007 points). The trend for females
age 75+ is similar to that of the males age 75+ across the three data waves with a
negligible overall decrease in inequality of 22.65% (-.012 points). From Wave II (1987)
to Wave III (1991), there is a 45.52% (.024 point) increase in inequality for females age
75+. However, this modest increase reverses from Wave III (1991) to Wave IV (1995)
exhibiting a 46.85% (-.035 point) decrease in female age 75+ inequality. The
interpretation of the Atkinson index for wave-specific coefficients indicates that recently,
Finnish males age 75+ have higher levels of inequality relative to their female
counterparts and it would take a larger redistribution of income to remove the inequality.
For example, in Wave IV (1994), if incomes were completely equal, 93.78% of current
national income would be required to achieve the same level of social welfare for males
age 75+ (as the current national income is currently distributed) compared to 96.01% of
current national income being required to achieve the level of social welfare for females
age 75+, meaning an additional 2.23% of national income is required for Finnish males
age 65-74 to achieve the level of social welfare of their female counterparts.
The Theil index for age cohort 65-74 by gender for the Finland data replicates the
Atkinson results (See Figure 6.7). For all waves of the Finland data, the Theil index for
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females age 65-74 is less than that of males age 65-74, demonstrating lower inequality
for females age 65-74. Over the three waves of data, there is a moderate hyperbolic
inequality trend for males age 65-74 with a slight increase in inequality (overall 0.94%).
The trend for females age 65-74 is similar to that of the males age 65-74 across all
three data waves with an overall decrease in inequality of 9.75%. From Wave II (1987)
to Wave III (1991), there is a 13.58% increase in inequality for females age 65-74.
However, this increase reverses from Wave III (1991) to Wave IV (1995) exhibiting a
20.54% decrease in female age 65-74 inequality.
The Theil index for age cohort 75+ by gender for the Finland data replicates the
Atkinson results (See Figure 6.8). For all waves of the Finland data, the Theil index for
females age 75+ is less than that of males age 75+, demonstrating lower inequality
among females 75+. Over the three waves of data, there is a hyperbolic inequality
trend for males age 75+ with an overall decrease in inequality of 16.09%. The trend for
females age 75+ is similar to that of the males age 75+ across all data waves with an
overall decrease in inequality of 17.48%. From Wave II (1987) to Wave III (1991), there
is a 63.03% increase in inequality for females age 75+. This increase reverses from
Wave III (1991) to Wave IV (1995) exhibiting a 49.38% decrease in female age 75+
inequality.
Relative Micro Change between Finland and Comparative Nations
Age Cohort 65-74
Finland vis-à-vis the United States: Relative to the overall e-weighted Theil index
for the age cohort 65-74, these United States and Finland subpopulations are diverging
(See Figure 6.9). Although, there is a slight movement toward convergence between
Waves II & III. What this means is that Finland’s outcomes at this specific micro level
are not replicating those of a liberal nation as classified by Esping-Andersen. The
Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism typology appears to remain valid at this level of
analysis for this subpopulation.
Finland vis-à-vis Germany: Relative to the overall e-weighted Theil index for the
age cohort 65-74, these Germany and Finland subpopulations are diverging between
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Waves II and Wave III. However, Wave IV indicates a convergence (See Figure 6.9).
What this means is that Finland’s outcomes at this specific micro level are possibly
moving toward those of a conservative nation as classified by Esping-Andersen. The
Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism may no longer be valid at this level of analysis for
this subpopulation.
Finland vis-à-vis Sweden: Relative to the overall e-weighted Theil index for the
age cohort 65-74, these Sweden and Finland subpopulations are parallel across all
datawaves while the actual level of inequality is slightly higher for Finland (See Figure
6.9). What this means is that Finland’s outcomes at this specific micro level are
replicating those of a social-democratic nation as classified by Esping-Andersen. The
Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism typology appears to remain valid at this level of
analysis for this subpopulation.
Figure 6.9 Theil Index (e-weighted) for Age Cohort 65-74
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Age Cohort 75+
Finland vis-à-vis the United States: Relative to the overall e-weighted Theil index
for the age cohort 75+, these United States and Finland subpopulations are diverging
across all datawaves (See Figure 6.10). What this means is that Finland’s outcomes at
the micro level are not replicating those of a liberal nation as classified by EspingAndersen. The results are consistent with the Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism
typology at this level of analysis for this subpopulation.
Finland vis-à-vis Germany: Relative to the overall e-weighted Theil index for the
age cohort 75+, these Germany and Finland subpopulations exhibit a crossover pattern
between Waves II and Wave III with Germany actually exhibiting less inequality in age
cohort 75+. However, Wave IV indicates a return to divergence (See Figure 6.10).
What this means is that for age cohort 75+, Finland may not be replicating conservative
regime outcomes as classified by Esping-Andersen. There appears to be no reason to
refute the Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism typology at this level of analysis for this
subpopulation.
Finland vis-à-vis Sweden: Relative to the overall e-weighted Theil index for the
age cohort 75+, these Sweden and Finland subpopulations are diverging between
Waves II & III with Finland producing greater inequality in age cohort 75+ (See Figure
6.10). Between Wave III & IV, there is a return to convergence with Finland and
Sweden’s coefficients closely approaching one another. What this means is that
Finland’s outcomes at the micro level are not consistently replicating those of a socialdemocratic nation over time as classified by Esping-Andersen. Although, Wave IV data
show a convergence, the results may suggest the Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism
appears are not consistently valid at this level of analysis for this subpopulation.
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Figure 6.10 Theil Index (e-weighted) for Age Cohort 75+
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Finland vis-à-vis the United States: Relative to the overall e-weighted Theil index
for males, these United States and Finland subpopulations are diverging or remaining
stable across three datawaves (See Figure 6.11). What this means is that Finland’s
outcomes at the micro level are not replicating those of a liberal nation as classified by
Esping-Andersen. There is no evidence to suggest that the Three Worlds of Welfare
Capitalism typology has become invalid at this level of analysis for this subpopulation.
Finland vis-à-vis Germany: Relative to the overall e-weighted Theil index for
males, these Germany and Finland subpopulations appear to be converging in Wave
IV. Between Waves II and Wave III, Finland and Germany may be converging due to
an increase in male inequality for Finland coupled with a decrease in male inequality in
Germany (See Figure 6.11). What this means is that Finland’s outcomes at the micro
level are possibly replicating those of a conservative nation as classified by Esping-
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Andersen. The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism typology may no longer be valid at
this level of analysis for this subpopulation.
Finland vis-à-vis Sweden: Relative to the overall e-weighted Theil index for
males, these Sweden and Finland subpopulations are converging across all datawaves
while the actual level of inequality is slightly higher for Finland (See Figure 6.11). This
convergence appears to be tightening in Wave IV due to a larger decrease in inequality
for Finland males. What this means is that Finland’s outcomes at the micro level
appear to be replicating those of a social-democratic nation as classified by EspingAndersen thus providing continuing support for the Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism
typology for this subpopulation.
Figure 6.11 Theil Index (e-weighted) for Males
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Finland vis-à-vis the United States: Relative to the overall e-weighted Theil index
for females, these United States and Finland subpopulations are mainly diverging
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across all datawaves (See Figure 6.12). There is a slight trend toward convergence
between Waves II & III. What this means is that Finland’s outcomes at the micro level
are not replicating those of a liberal nation as classified by Esping-Andersen. There is
no evidence to suggest that the Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism typology has
become invalid at this level of analysis for this subpopulation.
Finland vis-à-vis Germany: Relative to the overall e-weighted Theil index for the
females, these Germany and Finland subpopulations are converging between Waves II
and Wave III. However, Wave IV indicates the beginning of a slight divergence (See
Figure 6.12). What this means is that Finland’s outcomes at the micro level are not
replicating those of a conservative nation as classified by Esping-Andersen. The Three
Worlds of Welfare Capitalism typology appears to remain valid at this level of analysis
for this subpopulation.
Finland vis-à-vis Sweden: Relative to the overall e-weighted Theil index for
females, these Sweden and Finland subpopulations are converging across the later
datawaves while the actual level of inequality is slightly higher for Finland until Wave IV
(See Figure 6.12). There is a slight divergence in Wave III with Finland’s level of
inequality increasing slightly more than the increase in Sweden. What this means is
that Finland’s outcomes at the micro level are replicating those of a social-democratic
nation as classified by Esping-Andersen. The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism
typology appears to remain valid at this level of analysis for this subpopulation.
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Figure 6.12 Theil Index (e-weighted) for Females
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Age Cohort 65-74 - Male
Finland vis-à-vis the United States: Relative to the overall e-weighted Theil index
for males aged 65-74, these United States and Finland subpopulations are converging
between Waves II and III and diverging between Waves III and IV. There is only a slight
movement toward convergence between Waves II & III. Overall, the United States has
much higher levels of inequality across all datawaves (See Figure 6.13). What this
means is that Finland’s outcomes at the micro level are not replicating those of a liberal
nation as classified by Esping-Andersen. The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism
typology appears to remain valid at this level of analysis for this subpopulation.
Finland vis-à-vis Germany: Relative to the overall e-weighted Theil index for
males aged 65-74, these Germany and Finland subpopulations are diverging between
Waves II and Wave III. Between Wave III and Wave IV, almost complete convergence
is apparent from the data (See Figure 6.13). What this means is that Finland’s
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outcomes at the micro level during Wave IV are possibly replicating those of a
conservative nation as classified by Esping-Andersen. The Three Worlds of Welfare
Capitalism typology may no longer be valid at this level of analysis for this
subpopulation.
Finland vis-à-vis Sweden: Relative to the overall e-weighted Theil index for
males aged 65-74, these Sweden and Finland subpopulations are converging between
Waves II and III. The trend from Wave III to IV suggests the beginning of a slight
divergence, while the actual level of inequality is slightly higher for Finland for all
datawaves (See Figure 6.13). What this means is that Finland’s outcomes at the micro
level are replicating those of a social-democratic nation as classified by EspingAndersen. The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism typology appears to remain valid at
this level of analysis for this subpopulation.

Figure 6.13 Theil Index (e-weighted) for Male Age Cohort 65-74
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Age Cohort 65-74 - Female
Finland vis-à-vis the United States: Relative to the overall e-weighted Theil index
for females aged 65-74, these United States and Finland subpopulations are diverging
across Waves III and IV (See Figure 6.14). There is a movement toward convergence
between Waves II & III as demonstrated by the relatively large decrease in United
States inequality and the slight increase in inequality for Finnish females age 65-74.
What this means is that Finland’s outcomes at the micro level are not replicating those
of a liberal nation as classified by Esping-Andersen. The Three Worlds of Welfare
Capitalism typology appears to remain valid at this level of analysis for this
subpopulation.
Finland vis-à-vis Germany: Relative to the overall e-weighted Theil index for
females aged 65-74, these Germany and Finland subpopulations are diverging between
Waves II and Wave III. However, Wave IV indicates a beginning of a convergence
trend (See Figure 6.14). However, the level of inequality for German females age 65-74
is still higher than for the equivalent Finnish population. What this means is that
Finland’s outcomes at the micro level are possibly beginning to replicate those of a
conservative nation as classified by Esping-Andersen. However, inequality for this
German subpopulation is still greater than for Finland rendering any general statement
about this trend cautionary as best. The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism typology
appears to remain valid at this level of analysis for this subpopulation.
Finland vis-à-vis Sweden: Relative to the overall e-weighted Theil index for
females aged 65-74, these Sweden and Finland subpopulations are parallel across
three datawaves while the actual level of inequality is slightly higher for Finland across
three datawaves (See Figure 6.14). What this means is that Finland’s outcomes at the
micro level are replicating those of a social-democratic nation as classified by EspingAndersen. The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism typology appears to remain valid at
this level of analysis for this subpopulation.
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Figure 6.14 Theil Index (e-weighted) for Female Age Cohort 65-74
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Age Cohort 75+ - Male
Finland vis-à-vis the United States: Relative to the overall e-weighted Theil index
for males aged 75+, these United States and Finland subpopulations are diverging
between Waves II and III (See Figure 6.15). There is a parallel movement between
Waves III and IV with inequality for Finland remaining substantially lower. What this
means is that Finland’s outcomes at the micro level are not replicating those of a liberal
nation as classified by Esping-Andersen. The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism
typology appears to remain valid at this level of analysis for this subpopulation.
Finland vis-à-vis Germany: Relative to the overall e-weighted Theil index for
males aged 75+, these Germany and Finland subpopulations are sharply converging
between Waves II and Wave III. This convergence comes after a sharp increase in
inequality for German males aged 75+ between Wave I & II with no Finnish data
available for comparison. However, Wave IV indicates a crossover with inequality for
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German males age 75+ actually decreasing below that of Finland for the same
subpopulation (See Figure 6.15). What this means is that Finland’s outcomes at the
micro level are replicating those of a conservative nation as classified by EspingAndersen. The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism typology may no longer be valid at
this level of analysis for this subpopulation.
Finland vis-à-vis Sweden: Relative to the overall e-weighted Theil index for the
males age 75+, these Sweden and Finland subpopulations are diverging between
Waves II & III with Finnish inequality for males age 75+ increasing. However between
Wave II & IV, inequality for both countries’ males age 75+ is converging (See Figure
6.15). What this means is that Finland’s outcomes at the micro level are replicating
those of a social-democratic nation as classified by Esping-Andersen. The Three
Worlds of Welfare Capitalism appears to remain valid at this level of analysis for this
subpopulation.

Figure 6.15 Theil Index (e-weighted) for Male Age Cohort 75+
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Age Cohort 75+ - Female
Finland vis-à-vis the United States: Relative to the overall e-weighted Theil index
for the females age 75+, these United States and Finland subpopulations are
converging between Waves II & III with the United States still experiencing greater
inequality for females age 75+ (See Figure 6.16). There is a movement toward
divergence between Waves III & IV with a complete reversal of the previous inequality
reduction for the United States. What this means is that Finland’s outcomes at the
micro level are not replicating those of a liberal nation as classified by Esping-Andersen.
The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism typology appears to remain valid at this level of
analysis for this subpopulation.
Finland vis-à-vis Germany: Relative to the overall e-weighted Theil index for
females age 75+, these Germany and Finland subpopulations exhibit a crossover
between Waves II and Wave III with inequality for this German subpopulation actually
decreasing below that of the equivalent Finnish subpopulation. Between Waves III & IV,
this crossover is reversed because the divergence emerges with Finland exhibiting
decreasing inequality and inequality for German females 75+ increasing (See Figure
6.16). What this means is that Finland’s outcomes at the micro level may be replicating
those of a conservative nation as classified by Esping-Andersen. The Three Worlds of
Welfare Capitalism typology may no longer be valid at this level of analysis for this
subpopulation.
Finland vis-à-vis Sweden: Relative to the overall e-weighted Theil index for
females age 75+, these Sweden and Finland subpopulations are diverging between
Waves II & III with Finland showing a sharp increase in inequality for females age 75+.
Between Waves III & IV, there is a crossover. The coefficients for Finland and Sweden
actually intersect with Finland actually reducing inequality below that of Sweden for
females age 75+ in Wave IV (See Figure 6.16). What this means is that Finland’s
outcomes at the micro level are possibly not replicating those of a social-democratic
nation as classified by Esping-Andersen. The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism may
no longer be valid at this level of analysis for this subpopulation.
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Figure 6.16 Theil Index (e-weighted) for Female Age Cohort 75+
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Chapter Seven
Theil Confidence Interval Results
Validity of Theil Results
The Stata program ineqerr (Jolliffe & Krushelnytskyy, 1999) generated the Theil
Index with normal, bias-corrected, and percentile confidence intervals. Selected graphs
were chosen to show the normal confidence intervals for the overall and subpopulation
coefficients to discuss the potential validity of the Theil coefficients calculated with the
LIS data and associated Atkinson interpretation. Because the LIS data sources vary in
content from large samples of census survey data to registry-based population data, the
discussion of confidence intervals for the selected Theil coefficients adds a further
dimension to the interpretation of the Atkinson results.
Figure 7.1 shows the overall Theil Index (e-weighted) plotted with a 95%
confidence interval for the selected LIS datasets. As seen in the figure, the confidence
intervals for Sweden, Finland, and the United States are relatively compressed. This
indicates stronger inference for these data waves. Analyzing the data in quartiles
reveals The German waves I (1981), II (1984), and III (1989) have confidence intervals
in the 75% (fourth) quartile. This may indicate larger variation in these waves of
German data and thus indicate the need for more caution in inferences from these data
waves. An interesting point to make is that LIS does not indicate that Waves I-III for
Germany are problematic. Additionally, Wave III (1991) for the United States is in the
fourth quartile. This may indicate increased variation and reduced potential for valid
inference from data for this wave.
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Figure 7.1 Overall Theil Index (e-weighted) with 95% Confidence Interval (CI)
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Figure 7.2 displays the 95% confidence interval plotted with the Theil Index for
males. As seen in the figure, the confidence intervals for Finland and the United States
are relatively compressed. This indicates stronger potential inference for these data
waves. The German waves II (1984) and III (1989) are in the 75% (fourth) quartile of
the data and have much larger confidence intervals. Consistent with the finding of the
previous analyses, this may indicate larger variation in these waves of German data.
The Swedish wave III (1992) is also in the fourth quartile of the data and exhibits a
larger confidence interval. This may indicate larger variation in this wave of Swedish
data. The United States wave III (1991) also exhibits a larger confidence interval
because it is in the fourth quartile of the data. This may indicate larger variation in this
wave of United States data.
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Figure 7.2 Theil Index (e-weighted) for Males with 95% CI
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Figure 7.3 displays the 95% confidence interval for the Theil Index for females.
As seen in the figure, the confidence intervals for Finland and the United States are
relatively compressed. This indicates stronger potential inference for these data waves.
The German waves II (1984), III (1989), and IV (1994) have much larger confidence
intervals as determined by the quartile analysis. This may indicate larger variation in
these waves of German data. Swedish wave IV (1995) is also in the fourth quartile and
exhibits a larger confidence interval. This may indicate higher variation in this wave of
Swedish data.
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Figure 7.3 Theil Index (e-weighted) for Females with 95% CI
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Figure 7.4 displays the 95% confidence interval plotted with the Theil Index for
age cohort 65-74. As seen in the figure, the confidence intervals for Finland and the
United States are relatively compressed. This indicates stronger potential for accurate
inference with regard to generalization to the larger population for these data waves.
Analyzing the data in quartiles reveals that German waves II (1984) and III (1989) have
confidence intervals in the 75% (fourth) quartile. As with the overall Theil index, this
may once again indicate larger variation in these waves of German data. Additionally,
waves II (1987) and III (1991) for Sweden are in the fourth quartile of the data. This
may indicate increased variation in the data for these subpopulations and suggests that
we have less confidence in inferences drawn from these data.
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Figure 7.4 Theil Index (e-weighted) for Age Cohort 65-74 with 95% CI
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Figure 7.5 displays the 95% confidence interval plotted with the Theil Index for
age cohort 75+. As seen in the figure, the confidence intervals for Sweden are relatively
compressed. This indicates stronger potential for inference for these data waves. Yet
again, the German waves I (1981) and II (1984) are in the 75% (fourth) quartile and
have a much wider confidence interval. This may indicate larger variation in these
waves of German data. The Finnish wave III (1991) is also in the fourth quartile of the
data and exhibits a wide confidence interval. This may also indicate larger variation in
this wave of Finnish data. The United States wave III (1991) also exhibits a larger
confidence interval because it is in the fourth quartile of the data and may exhibit a
larger variation in this wave of United States data.
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Figure 7.5 Theil Index (e-weighted) for Age Cohort 75+ with 95% CI
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In the overall context of this research, the confidence intervals provide a
measurement to assess the validity of the Theil Index and corresponding Atkinson
Index. From the data, German datawaves display the largest confidence intervals
around the specific subpopulation Theil coefficient and possibly caution relative to the
interpretation of the indices. However, for the majority of the remaining datawaves, the
validity of the Theil coefficients is strong and suggests that inference to the
corresponding Atkinson coefficient can be with reasonable confidence.
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Chapter Eight
Synthesis, Implications, and Conclusions
Synthesis
This dissertation has 1) examined the continuing viability of Esping-Andersen’s
Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism typology; 2) employed a new analytical approach
involving the application of a disaggregated model of subpopulations in nations to
Esping-Andersen’s typology; and 3) explored the value of current inequality indices that
take us beyond the use of the Gini coefficient. Before addressing the specific aims of
the research, a summary of the overall findings for each nation and respective
subpopulations is presented.
The United States has experienced a modest increase in inequality for the overall
population as measured by both the Atkinson and Theil indices (See Figures 5.2 and
5.3). Relative to Finland, inequality for the aggregate United States population appears
to be exhibiting a divergent trend (See Figure 5.4). A modest increase in inequality is
also exhibited for gender and age cohort 75+ subpopulations in aggregate and both
genders aged 75+ when disaggregated (See Figures 6.1 - 6.4, 6.6, and 6.8).
Effectively, no change is exhibited in inequality for both the age cohort 65-74
subpopulation and when gender is disaggregated within this cohort (See Figures 6.3 6.5, and 6.7). Relative to Finland, all subpopulations are exhibiting a divergent trend in
inequality (See Figures 6.9-6.16). This is consistent with the continuing validity of
Esping-Andersen’s Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism typology with respect to the
United States liberal regime in both the aggregate and disaggregate population. In
addition, these findings suggest that the trend of higher inequality over time is both
gender and age-neutral because the increase occurs in all subpopulations. This is not
to discount the need for targeted public policy as the levels of inequality for each
subpopulation vary. Given the overall trend toward higher income inequality, the United
States may be in a more volatile policy dilemma as policymakers address pension
viability issues in the future. Also, these findings of higher income inequality across the
entire population are consistent with a liberal regime’s dependence on market economic
forces in generating adequate income for pensioners (Esping-Andersen, 1990).
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Conversely, Germany has experienced a modest decrease in inequality for the
overall population (See Figures 5.2 and 5.3). Relative to Finland, inequality for the
aggregate German population appears to exhibit a convergent trend in inequality (See
Figure 5.4). Modest decreases in inequality are also exhibited for males, age cohorts
65-74 and 75+, males aged 65-74, and both genders aged 75+ (See Figures 6.1-6.8).
These lower levels of inequality may indicate a shift in German public policy with a
resulting more equalized income distributions among certain subpopulations of older
adults. In contrast, there is effectively no change over time in inequality for overall
German females, while females aged 65-74 have exhibited a modest increase in
inequality (See Figures 6.1, 6.2, 6.5, and 6.7). Unchanged inequality does not suggest
an improvement in the income situation for females; nonetheless, is also does not
suggest a decline in the income status of females. These findings may suggest that
German pension policy outcomes are gender-neutral for females versus being genderpositive for males. This policy outcome is consistent with Esping-Andersen’s definition
of a conservative regime with regard to its policy focus on the male as sole breadwinner
(Esping-Andersen, 1990). Relative to Finland, subpopulation analyses reveal a split
with regard to a convergence-divergence trend. Four subpopulations exhibit a
convergence with regard to Finland: males, 65-74 age cohort and males aged 65-74
and aged 75+ (See Figures 6.9, 6.11, 6.13, and 6.15). The remaining four
subpopulations (females, age cohort 75+, and females aged 65-74 and aged 75+)
exhibit a divergent trend with regard to Finland (See Figures 6.10, 6.12, 6.14, and 6.16).
The convergent trend findings suggest that Germany and Finland are beginning to
producing similar outcomes relative to the income status of certain subpopulations.
One possibility is that pension policy in Germany is producing more egalitarian
outcomes for young-old and old-old German males as well as young old adults across
gender. The alternative explanation of Finnish pension policy producing more
conservative outcomes does not appear as plausible because the convergence may be
occurring more as a result of the downward movement in the inequality measurement
for Germany rather than an upward movement for Finland. Esping-Andersen’s Three
Worlds of Welfare Capitalism typology may not remain valid with respect to these
subpopulations as they may be converging into a European (Euro) regime. The
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divergent trend findings may suggest that for young-old (65-74) and old-old (75+)
German females as well as the old-old aggregate population, German pension policy
may still be producing less egalitarian income distributions. These findings lend support
for the need for gender-specific pension policy to address continuing inequalities.
Sweden has experienced an increase in inequality for the overall population (See
Figures 5.2 and 5.3). Relative to Finland, inequality for the aggregate Swedish
population appears to be exhibiting a parallel trend (See Figure 5.4). Sweden also
exhibits effectively no change in inequality for females aged 65-74 (See Figures 6.5 and
6.7). Modest increases in income inequality were exhibited for the remaining
subpopulations: male, female, age cohorts 65-74 and 75+, males aged 65-74 and 75+,
and females aged 75+ (See Figures 6.1-6.8). Relative to Finland, Sweden exhibits a
mixed trend depending on subpopulation. Convergence is suggested for males,
females, 75+ age cohort, and males aged 75+ (See Figures 6.10, 6.11, 6.12, and 6.15).
These findings suggest that nations classified within the social-democratic regime by
Esping-Andersen (1990) produced similar inequality outcomes from the 1980’s to mid1990’s for these subpopulations. This suggests that Esping-Andersen’s Three Worlds
of Welfare Capitalism typology remains valid at this level of analysis. A divergent trend
is suggested for females aged 75+ in Sweden in comparison with Finland (See Figure
6.16). For older Swedish females, this may suggest a decline in their income status
possibly as a result of gender-negative pension policy such as a reduction in the
number of females receiving the national pension. A parallel trend is exhibited between
Sweden and Finland for age cohort 65-74, and both genders of age cohort 65-74 with
income inequality being greater for all datawaves (See Figures 6.9, 6.13, and 6.14).
These findings suggest that Finland and Sweden are experiencing their respective
income inequality trends in concert. However, Finland has a slightly higher level of
inequality over the time period analyzed.
Finland has experienced a neutral trend in inequality for the overall population
(See Figures 5.2 and 5.3). For the aggregate population, Finland appears to be
diverging from the United States, converging with Germany, and remaining parallel with
Sweden in terms of overall inequality as discussed previously (See Figure 5.4). The
convergence of conservative and social-democratic regimes offers a possible
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modification to Esping-Andersen’s typology. In the future, there may be only two
regimes in the world of welfare capitalism; one liberal and the other characterized as
either “European” or “continental”. Specific to Finland, the primary focus of this study,
this finding may be perceived as contrary to previous research (Jantti, Kangas, &
Ritakallio, 1994). Jantti and colleagues (1994) proposed that the Finnish pension
system was actually converging with those of continental Europe, a finding that was
discussed with Dr. Olli Kangas during my field research in Finland. However, findings
from this research suggest that Germany may actually be converging with Scandinavia
as opposed to Finland converging with Germany. The evidence for this phenomenon
from the present analysis is the larger decrease in German inequality for subpopulations
where convergence is suggested. Given Finland’s aggressive European Union (EU)
integration, it is conceivable that Finland is emerging as a policy leader versus a
historical policy follower.
Concerning the continued viability of Esping-Andersen’s Three Worlds of Welfare
Capitalism typology, the findings suggest two main points. First, Esping-Andersen’s
typology appears to remain viable over the time period covered in this analysis at the
macro level for at least one nation classified within the liberal regime (the United
States). This conclusion is supported by the previous discussion of the divergent trend
between the United States and Finland. Second, the conservative (Germany) and
social-democratic regimes (Sweden and Finland) may be shifting from their respective
classifications at the macro level into a more European (Euro) regime. This shared
pattern is leading to a newly emergent “Euro” welfare state typology; It may be
characterized by conservative regimes shifting away from status-reinforcing pension
policy to a more egalitarian policy attitude toward certain subpopulations. The findings
from this research that lend support to the conservative regime shifting toward the
social-democratic regimes are those with certain micro level areas of decreasing
inequality for Germany (See Figures 6.9 and 6.11). This conclusion is also supported
by the previous discussion on the trend between Finland and the comparative nations of
Germany and Sweden. This finding addresses the research of Myles and Quadagno
(1997) regarding retrenchment and the convergence of European social policy in the
1990’s. Specifically, the findings from this research question Myles and Quadagno’s
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(1997) view that retrenchment is causing all nations to reduce their levels of social
spending, e.g., developing policies to reduce pension benefits and/or the number of
beneficiaries, because of the reduction in inequality for German males and overall
stability in inequality for Finland and Sweden. However, the LIS data ending with Wave
IV in the mid-1990s may not fully reflect the actual effect of retrenchment.
Concerning the disaggregated analytic approach, the typology shows a similar
conservative-social democratic convergence at the micro level as discussed in the
preceding paragraphs. Specifically, the trend for males across all age cohorts suggests
that for these subpopulations, the two regimes are converging. The trend for males in
this conservative regime may indicate an improving inequality status relative to historical
experience (See Figures 6.13 and 6.15). Findings for males in these social-democratic
regimes exhibit a stable trend in inequality (See Figures 6.13 and 6.15). However, the
findings for females do not reflect a conservative-social democratic convergence for this
subpopulation (See Figures 6.14 and 6.16). In the context of Finland, this nonconverging trend may indicate that the Finnish pension system is maintaining autonomy
for females relative to spousal employment as well as pension eligibility and related
benefits. This provides evidence that gender-constructed pension policies, as
suggested by Sainsbury (1999), currently exist in some form within these socialdemocratic regimes, but still need developing in this conservative regime. In order to
attain full convergence, Germany needs to address the entitlement features of both
national and employment pensions as they are now tied to employment status.
Finally, concerning the value of multi-index analysis versus a single-index
analysis, the research suggests that the basic interpretability of the Atkinson Index
combined with the generation of 95% confidence intervals for the Theil index provides a
more robust method of analysis not offered with a single index, such as the Gini, alone.
For example, Pearson correlations suggest a very high correlation between the
Atkinson and Theil coefficients (See Table 5.2). These high correlations suggest that
the interpretability of the Atkinson Index can be augmented by the inferential validity of
the Theil Index. Interpreting the specific Atkinson Index allows the impact of a given
inequality change to be estimated. For example, with respect to Finland, the Theil Index
confidences are small (indicating a high level of confidence) except for Wave II for age
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cohort 75+, and even this interval passes the quartile test. The interpretation of the
changes in the Atkinson Index over the time periods and subpopulations should more
accurately reflect the experience of the entire population. In other words, the validity
gained from the confidence interval estimates of the Theil Index provides better
inference to the value of the Atkinson Index interpretation across the general population.
The dual-index analysis design in this research provides additional support for the use
of the LIS data in comparative research because it alleviates the concerns of those
skeptics who criticize the use of population weighted data.
In this research, the Atkinson and Theil Indices provided similar trend results for
the majority of macro and micro analyses. The German datasets displays the most
variation in the indices. Instances where the inequality trends differ include: Swedish
females between Waves II and III; Finnish males and age cohort 65-74 between Waves
II and III; German males, females, 65-74 and 75+ age cohorts, and overall between
Waves I and II; and United States males and 75+ age cohort between Waves III-IV.
These trend differences may be result of problems with the specific datasets and
reported income for those specific subpopulations or algorithmic difference in index
calculations. One research design modification that might reduce the number of
variations in the indices is to adjust the selected level of epsilon for the Atkinson Index.
Limitations
As with all research, there are some limitations to both the analysis and
subsequent interpretation of the results in this dissertation. First, there are only three
waves of data for Finland. This data limitation is due to Statistics Finland only
submitting data for Waves III, III, and IV of the LIS project. Finland will submit 2000
registry-based income data for Wave V, thus making it possible to conduct research on
more than three waves in future research. Second, limitations also exist in the
interpretation of Atkinson results where the Theil Index varied in a particular datawave
for certain subpopulations as discussed in the previous section. However, this limitation
should not diminish the utility of the dual-index method as an analytic technique
because selecting a different level of epsilon may produce complete alignment of the
indices trends over time. In addition, this research did not allow for the determination of
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the specific income variables contributing most to the specific inequality of
subpopulations as the main foci were to validate Esping-Andersen’s typology,
disaggregate the analysis, and use a new dual-index approach. Knowing the directional
change of these regimes is important in and of itself because areas where policy
modifications are needed have been identified. While this research has assumed the
transfer of confidence level of the Theil Index to the interpretation of the Atkinson is
appropriate because of the high levels of correlation, there are of course statistical
scenarios where this might not be the case.
Implications for Understanding Finland
This dissertation has revealed several implications for generating a better
understanding of Finland and Finnish policy direction relative to pensions. Although
Finland’s inequality outcomes do not show a convergence with the liberal regime, future
policy adding more aggressive private investments to pension portfolios may cause a
shift in this direction. Future LIS data may provide empirical evidence for an increase in
inequality as the pension system takes on more economic risk. If there is actually a
convergence between Germany and Finland relative to inequality outcomes, then
Finland is possibly in a stronger position to direct future policy development within the
European Union. In addition, as Germany exhibited inequality shifts toward the socialdemocratic regimes, targeted policy should be developed for other conservative nations
in order to replicate the female outcomes for Finland. Finland may be in a policy
position to assist in the development of these policies as EU integration continues. In a
broader context, the measured inequality outcomes for Finland suggest that the
corrective policy action taken in the early-1990’s may need more time to become
manifest in public data.
Specific to Finland, this dissertation suggests the addition of occupational
categories in an analysis relative to income inequality to identify specific occupations, if
any, that may require targeted policy resulting from higher levels of income inequality. If
Finland is to emerge as a policy leader, then more in-depth analysis of all pension
schemes should be conducted. As global aging trends cause nations, such as Finland,
to actively address pension income and economic well-being of older adults, more in-
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depth research should be conducted via the use of factor analysis on the Theil Index
inequality measures. A factor analysis would identify income variables that are
contributing more to the overall inequality for the subpopulations.
Implications for Older Adult Pensioners
This dissertation research suggests some key implications for older adults
regarding pension policy development and the viability of future pension benefits. The
evidence from this research suggests that if the current trend continues, older adults in
the United States will continue to experience increasing income inequality. Also,
German older adults entering retirement are likely to have increased income inequality
as they age given the 65-74 age cohort is experiencing greater inequality than their
older counterparts. Older adults in Finland and Sweden are experiencing relatively
stable levels of inequality; as new private pension options are implemented, these older
adults will likely have to make future consumption and investment adjustments to reflect
the variable returns on pensions in the private market in social-democratic regimes.
Implications for Policy Development
This research suggests some key implications for policy development. First, if
Esping-Andersen’s typology is no longer valid in contemporary time regarding the
conservative and social-democratic regimes, then policymakers must begin to address
policy changes with this regime convergence in mind. Second, if Germany is
converging with Finland for certain subpopulations, the fiscal impact of this convergence
should be addressed because pension contributions may not be able to fund the
anticipated expenditures, especially for German males.
This research has implications for policy development in less developed nations.
As non-OECD nations, such as Brazil and Chile, begin to assimilate into the world
economy and develop social benefit programs, policymakers from these nations will
look for developmental frameworks (Paul & Paul, 1995). Esping-Andersen’s typology
may not be applicable to these nations given non-OECD nations were omitted from the
typology development. Furthermore, developing a non-OECD sensitive typology may
be difficult as data collection and reporting problems for these nations may confound
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any typology development (Diamond, 1996; Feldstein, 1998; Montecinos, 1997;
Williamson & Hochman, 1995). In addition, as Eastern European nations, e.g., Hungary
and the Czech Republic, stand out as future exemplars for pension development in the
former Eastern bloc, they may exhibit policy characteristics that merit adoption by the
developed nations (Ferge, 1997). Developing nations need to be integrated into the
welfare state discussion to reduce the likelihood of past inequalities being repeated
(Buss, Beres, Hofstetter, & Pomidor, 1994; Haney, 1997; Lee, 2000; Musil, 1995;
Orosz, 1990; Velkoff Victoria & Kinsella, 1993).
Suggestions for Future Research
The use of factor analysis on the Theil indices of each subpopulation would allow
the identification of the income inequality relative to its location in specific income
variables. This type of analysis would provide further empirical support to direct
pension policy toward specific income types or targeted subpopulations. This type of
analysis would have been inappropriate for the scope of this dissertation because the
income variables are only disaggregated in Wave IV and this research used all available
datawaves. This dissertation suggests future examination of different nations within
Esping-Andersen’s framework to further validate countries using the duel-index
approach. All twenty-five LIS nations should be examined to further clarify the
usefulness of the dual-index approach. In addition, the addition of occupational status
(where available in the LIS datasets), and geographical location could enhance this
research by determining if location or employment inequality trends are shifting as well.
Finally, select registry-based nations such as Finland or Norway should be
selected for a pilot study linking actual health outcomes with income data. Research on
income and health could enhance the overall scope of the LIS data. I look forward to
subsequent LIS datawaves becoming available to confirm or modify the findings in this
research. A few nations have released Wave V (2000) data for integration into the LIS
database. From a theoretical point of view, for those interested in the social welfare
index literature, it might also be useful to explore setting epsilon at different levels
depending on the characteristics of each welfare state in the individual nation. In
addition, epsilon may be set across a continuum, e.g., 0 to 2 in .10 increments, for all
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comparative nations to examine how slight changes in epsilon affect inequality for each
nation.
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Appendix A
The Administrative and Benefit Structure of the Finnish Pension System
The information is compiled from several sources at Kansaneläkelaitos (KELA) –
The Social Insurance Institution of Finland (KELA - The Social Insurance Institute of
Finland, 2000).
Administrative Organization
Currently, the Sosiaali ja Terveysministeriö - Finnish Ministry of Social Affairs and
Health has the responsibility of general supervision of the private-sector statutory
pension schemes. Kansaneläkelaitos (KELA) - The Social Insurance Institution has the
responsibility of administering the universal and disability pensions through district
offices, which are directed by Parliament-appointed governing body. Local boards
determine old-age and survivors' benefit. Local municipalities collect universal pension
contributions via municipal (local) taxation. Eläketurvakeskus - The Central Pension
Security Institute is the statutory central body that managed private sector earningsrelated pension schemes. Carriers for earnings-related pension schemes are approved
private insurance companies, pension funds and foundations that are supervised, as of
April 1, 1999, by the Finnish Insurance Supervision Authority. Pension programs in the
public sector are administered by the Local Government Pensions Institute under the
general supervision of the Sisäasiainministeriö – Finnish Ministry of the Interior.
Pension programs for State employees are administered by the Valtiokonttori - State
Treasury Office under the general supervision of the Valtiovarainministeriö - Ministry of
Finance.
Old Age and Death Coverage
The universal (national) pension is income-tested. Coverage for the universal
(national) pension is extended to all Finnish citizens (age 16 and older) who have
resided in Finland for at least 3 years as well as citizens of other countries who have
resided in Finland for 5 years or more immediately preceding pension. The earningsrelated pensions are not income-tested. Coverage is extended to all regular employees
aged 14 and older. There is no lower limit of earnings or duration of work. The Finnish
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government has special systems for seasonal, part-time, maritime, public employees,
farmers, and self-employed workers.
Source of Funds
Insured person:
•

Universal pension--employees, none.

•

Earnings-related pension--employees, 4.7% of earnings.

•

Earnings-related pension--self-employed: 21.0% (if under age 43, 10.5% for the
first three years of self-employment), maximum earnings: 474,111 marks a year
[Exchange rate: U.S. $1.00 equals 5.17 marks. One euro equals 5.95 marks].

Employer:
•

Universal pension: 2.4% to 4.9% of payroll (private employers, depending on
capital of employer) or 3.95% of payroll (public employers).

•

Earnings-related pension: 17.4% for employers with fewer than 50 employees;
10.34% to 24.35%, according to age and gender of employee, for employers with
more than 50 employees.

Government:
About 36% of universal pensions (about 3/4 of this borne by local governments); and all
universal survivor pensions. Also pays cost of earnings-related pension for selfemployed and farmers not covered by their own contributions. Earnings-related
pension contributions are paid on total wage. Average for all employees and
employers: 21.5% of payroll in 1999.
Qualifying Conditions
To qualify for the universal (national) old-age pension, a person must attain the
age of 65. Retirement is not necessary to obtain this specific pension. One qualifying
codicil is that the universal (national) pension is not payable to Finnish citizens living
abroad after 1 year unless the person has previously been a resident of Finland for at
least 10 years before beginning pension or abroad for medical reasons. A person can
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qualify for an early universal (national) pension beginning as early at 60, but no later
than 64. Otherwise, full pension benefit rates apply for that individual.
To qualify for an earnings-related pension, a person must be 65 years older and
retired covered employment. This is known as the agent-state relationship (Kenc &
Perraudin, 1997). Also, the person must have 40 years' of work coverage to be entitled
to the full earning-related pension. A person can qualify for an early earnings-related
pension (reduced a percentage for each year prior to reaching age 65) beginning as
early at 60, but no later than 64. Otherwise, full benefit rates apply for that individual.
Part-time pension (earnings-related pension only): Aged 56-64
Reduced work schedule (16-28 hours per week and earnings equal to 35% to 70% of
full-time earnings), employed full-time for 12 of past 18 months, and covered during at
least 5 of preceding 15 years.
Individual early retirement pension: Age 58-64, unable to work due to mental or
physical exhaustion; age, long-term service, working conditions, etc. also considered.
Survivor pension--Universal pension: (no income-test) deceased lived in Finland at date
of death for at least 3 years if citizen (if not citizen, 5 years); widow(er), if Finnish citizen
must have lived in Finland at date of death or move to Finland within one year of death
of spouse (non-citizen must have lived in Finland 5 years before date of death). Widow
(er) must be under age 65, married to deceased before age 65, caring for a child under
age 18 or, if childless, be at least 50 years old at spouse's death; in addition, must have
been married at least 5 years.
Supplementary survivor's pension (income-tested): Same as under universal old-age
pension.
Universal orphan's pension: Under age 18 (under age 20 if student); resident of Finland
or moved to Finland within one year.
Orphan's supplement (income-tested): Under age 18 (not for students aged 18-20).
Earnings-related pension: deceased was insured or pensioner at death, married before
the deceased spouse's 65th birthday; if childless, couple must have been married for at
least 5 years, and survivor must have been under age 50 at time of marriage and at
least age 50 or disability pensioner for at least 3 years when widowed. Paid to widower
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on equal terms and under certain circumstances to former spouse. An orphan's pension
is paid to a child under age 18.
Old-Age Benefits
Universal old-age pension (income-tested): 60 to 2,547 marks per month,
according to municipality, marital status, other income (including other pension)
received. Income test: Benefit reduced to 50% of the difference between other pension
income and 245 marks per month; pension not payable if other pension income
exceeds 4,406-5,219 marks per month, according to family status and municipality. The
amount is also adjusted to the length of residence in Finland, with the full amount
payable after 40 years of residence, reduced on a pro-rata basis if less than 40 years.
Other components (as of January 1996): Housing allowance, proportional to
income and housing expenses, up to 722 to 2,594 marks a month [Exchange rate: U.S.
$1.00 equals 5.17 marks. One euro equals 5.95 marks], according to municipality,
marital status, and number of family members; pensioner care allowance: 278, 691, or
1,382 marks a month, based on extent of care needed. Early pension: Payable from
age 60; amount reduced by 4-6 percent per year claimed before age 65.
Deferred pension: Increment of 1 percent of pension for each month deferred
after age 65. Universal pension and supplements adjusted automatically each year for
changes in cost-of-living index.
Earnings-related pension: 1.5% of average pensionable earnings for each year of
employment between ages 23 and 59. 2.5% for ages 60 to 65. 0.5% for each year
before July 1962. Pensionable earnings are average revalued earnings for the last 10
years. Pension is determined separately for each employment contract.
Early retirement pension (from age 60) reduced by 5.64%-6% per year
depending on the year of birth of the beneficiary. Pension increased by 1% for each
month of deferment beyond age 65.
Partial pension: 50% of the difference between former full-time income and parttime income.
Adjustment: Earnings-related benefits payable to pensioners aged 65 and older are
adjusted yearly according to 20% of the annual average increase in wage (or 50% if
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pensioner under age 65) and 80% of annual average increase in price (50% if
pensioner under age 65) changes.
Survivor Benefits
Universal survivor pension: First 6 months following spouse's death, maximum
basic pension of 1,351 marks a month, plus means-tested supplement up to 1,196
marks a month, and housing allowance-according to geographical area--payable to
widow(er). From 7th month, income-tested (same as universal old-age basic benefit,
except if surviving spouse caring for dependent child).Adjusted for length of residence
of the deceased. Orphans (under age 18, or age 20 if student): Up to 264 marks a
month; full orphan, up to 528 marks a month; either may be increased by maximum 352
marks a month (income-tested); increase not applicable to student aged 18-20.
Adjustment: Universal pension and allowances adjusted automatically each year for
changes in the cost-of-living index.
Earnings-related survivor pension: Widow(er), up to 50% of pension payable to
insured. No means test for first 6 months if surviving spouse under age 65 and not
receiving a pension in his/her own right. If the survivor is supporting children, no income
test before the youngest child is 18 years old. Income-test: the retirement or disability
pension personally accrued by the surviving spouse (even if not in payment) reduces
the amount of the survivor's pension. Orphans (under age 18): 1/3 of insured's pension
for 1, up to 5/6 for 4 or more. Full orphan's pension increased by another 1/6, not to
exceed insured's pension. Adjustment: Earnings-related benefits payable to pensioners
aged 65 and older are adjusted yearly according to 20% of the annual average increase
in wage (or 50% if pensioner under age 65) and 80% of annual average increase in
price (50% if pensioner under age 65) changes.
Survivor pension: Payable to widow, widower, and orphans. Maximum survivor
pension: 70% of earnings of insured. Funeral grant: 19,900 marks.
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Appendix B
Stata Program Code
STATA Program to calculate Selected Inequality Indices
** user=id
** password=password
** package=stata
** project=lis
run profile
#delimit;
global keepit "casenum hweight num6574 numge75 d1 d3 d4 d5 d7 d27 dpi";
program define setups;
drop if d5==3;
drop if dpi==.;
drop if dpi==0;
replace hweight=1 if hweight==0;
generate ey=(dpi/(d4^0.5));
generate pweight=(hweight*d4);
gen cweight=hweight*d27;
gen eweight=((num6574+numge75)*hweight);
end;
program define bottom;
setups;
quietly sum ey [w=pweight];
generate botlin=0.01*_result(3);
replace ey=botlin if ey<botlin;
end;
program define top;
quietly sum dpi [w=pweight], de;
generate toplin=10*_result(10);
replace ey=(toplin/(d4^0.5)) if dpi>toplin;
end;
program define povl;
qui summ ey [w=pweight], de;
qui gen povl1=_result(10)*.4;
qui gen povl2=_result(10)*.5;
qui gen povl3=_result(10)*.6;
end;
program define lisdiss;
**1-17;
recode d1 1/17=1;
**18-64;
recode d1 18/64=2;
**65-74;
recode d1 65/74=3;
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**75plus;
recode d1 75/100=4;
label define d1lbl 1 "1-17" 2 "18-64" 3 "65-74" 4 "75 plus";
label values d1 d1lbl;
label define d3lbl 1 "Male" 2 "Female";
label values d3 d3lbl;
egen region=group(d1);
table d1;
table region;
table region d3;
ineqdeco ey [w=eweight], by(region);
ineqdeco ey [w=eweight], by(d3);
ineqdeco ey [w=eweight], by(region d3);
atkinson ey;
atkinson ey if d1==3;
atkinson ey if d1==4;
atkinson ey if d3==1;
atkinson ey if d3==2;
atkinson ey if d1==3 & d3==1;
atkinson ey if d1==3 & d3==2;
atkinson ey if d1==4 & d3==1;
atkinson ey if d1==4 & d3==2;
ineqerr ey [w=eweight] if d1==3;
ineqerr ey [w=eweight] if d1==4;
ineqerr ey [w=eweight] if d3==1;
ineqerr ey [w=eweight] if d3==2;
ineqerr ey [w=eweight] if d1==3 & d3==1;
ineqerr ey [w=eweight] if d1==3 & d3==2;
ineqerr ey [w=eweight] if d1==4 & d3==1;
ineqerr ey [w=eweight] if d1==4 & d3==2;
end;
use $keepit using $ccyyh;
di “Income Inequality Coefficients for LIS Country YY”;
bottom;
top;
povl;
lisdiss;
use $keepit using $ccyyh, clear;
di “Income Inequality Coefficients for LIS Country YY”;
bottom;
top;
povl;
lisdiss;
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